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RESURRECTING “A COMPREHENSIVE CHARTER
OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY”: THE LATENT POWER
OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Sandeep Vaheesan* 
After decades of virtual invisibility, monopoly and oligopoly are 
attracting the attention of leading political and public figures again.  
Corporate control of markets is now seen as an important source of 
economic and political ills in American society.  These ills include not just 
higher prices for consumers, but also increased economic inequality and a 
compromised democracy.  This corporate domination of economy and 
politics was not inevitable, dictated by impersonal forces such as 
“globalization” or “technology.”  On the contrary, it is the result of 
conscious policy choices initiated in the late 1970s and 1980s that 
succeeded in focusing antitrust law on the narrow concept of economic 
efficiency and establishing legal standards friendly to powerful businesses.  
The weakened antitrust laws have given large corporations freedom to 
dominate markets through mergers, exclusionary conduct, and restrictive 
trade practices. 
The Supreme Court has the power to undo these changes, but an 
antitrust revival through the common law process is doubtful and, at best, 
sure to be protracted.  When favorable political circumstances exist, 
advocates of renewed antitrust enforcement should instead look to the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).  The FTC has broad policymaking 
authority under modern administrative law and has quasi-legislative power 
delegated to it by Congress.  The FTC can resurrect antitrust law under the 
FTC Act’s prohibition on unfair methods of competition.  In using this 
power, the FTC should reject the ahistorical efficiency model for antitrust 
and embrace the political economic goals articulated by Congress when it 
created the Commission in 1914.  In an era of high inequality, diminished 
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economic opportunity, and elite capture of politics, the goals of protecting 
consumers, maintaining open markets, and dispersing economic and 
political power remain as important as ever.  To restore competitive market 
structures, the FTC should establish a series of presumptions against 
competitively suspicious practices and challenge market power highly 
damaging to the public. 
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INTRODUCTION
After decades of general neglect,1 monopoly and oligopoly are now a 
topic of wide interest in the United States.  Corporate domination of wide 
swaths of the economy is a focus of public debate.2  This discussion is not 
confined to one part of the political spectrum.  A progressive senator,3 the 
2016 Democratic candidate for the presidency,4 the centrist Obama White 
House,5 and a conservative business publication6 have all agreed that the 
 1.  See Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY
235-51 (2016) (providing statistics on declining U.S. antitrust enforcement since 1970, and 
the implications of weak enforcement in several industries); Maurice E. Stucke, 
Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 553-54 (2012) (observing the lack of 
public interest in both antitrust specifically and economic concentration generally); see also
Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2543, 2544 (2013) (describing the antitrust system as one “captured by lawyers and 
economists advancing their own self-referential goals, free of political control and economic 
accountability”).
 2.  See Ryan Cooper, Even Republicans are Getting Fed Up with Monopolies.  Here’s 
Why., THE WEEK (Mar. 31, 2016), http://theweek.com/articles/613950/even-republicans-are-
getting-fed-monopolies-heres-why [https://perma.cc/968Y-MELM] (“[T]oday, the results of 
monopoly are so patently horrible that even some conservatives are beginning to come 
around.”); Paul Krugman, Challenging the Oligarchy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/17robert-reich-challenging-oligarchy/ 
[https://perma.cc/5T77-TX3X] (describing an argument attributing increased economic 
inequality to monopolies); Matt Stoller, How Democrats Killed Their Populist Soul,
ATLANTIC, Oct. 24, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/how-
democrats-killed-their-populist-soul/504710/ (“At the same time that the nation has 
achieved perhaps the most tolerant culture in U.S. history, the destruction of the anti-
monopoly and anti-bank tradition in the Democratic Party has also cleared the way for the 
greatest concentration of economic power in a century.”). 
 3.  See Elizabeth Warren, Senator, Keynote Address at New America’s Open Markets 
Program Event: Reigniting Competition in the American Economy, (June 29, 2016) 
(arguing that the lack of competition in the markets “threatens our economy, and threatens 
our democracy”). 
 4.  See Hillary Clinton, Hillary Clinton: Being Pro-Business Doesn’t Mean Hanging 
Consumers Out to Dry, QUARTZ (Oct. 20, 2015), http://qz.com/529303/hillary-clinton-
being-pro-business-doesnt-mean-hanging-consumers-out-to-dry/ [https://perma.cc/5EZL-
JB2E] (describing the negative impacts of monopolies on American consumers). 
 5.  See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF 
MARKET POWER 4-6 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/ 
20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3CX-KQ3G] (detailing the 
proof of decline in competition). 
 6.  See Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs-
giant-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing [https://perma.cc/759G-FD59] (arguing that 
high profits indicate a need for competition). 
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non-competitive structure of many markets hurts the public.  The harms 
from concentrated markets appear to range from higher prices for consumer 
products7 and lower incomes for producers8 to the multi-decade growth in 
inequality9 to the decline in business formation10 to the subversion of 
democratic politics by powerful private entities.11
Importantly, commentators have recognized that the current industrial 
structure in the United States was not inevitable.  Present economic 
arrangements are the product of a deliberate policy choice—starting in the 
late 1970s and accelerating in the 1980s under the Reagan administration—
to neuter the enforcement of the antitrust laws outside of price fixing, bid 
rigging and market allocation between competitors.12  Subsequent 
administrations, including Democratic ones, have followed this antitrust 
philosophy.13  Antitrust officials in the executive branch and federal judges 
 7.  See, e.g., id. (“Last year America’s airlines made $24 billion—more than Alphabet, 
the parent company of Google.  Even as the price of fuel, one of airlines’ main expenses, 
collapsed alongside the oil price, little of that benefit was passed on to consumers through 
lower prices, with revenues remaining fairly flat.  After a bout of consolidation in the past 
decade the industry is dominated by four firms with tight financial discipline and many 
shareholders in common.  And the return on capital is similar to that seen in Silicon 
Valley.”) 
 8.  Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice Stucke, The E-Scraper and E-Monopsony, AUTHORS
GUILD (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.authorsguild.org/industry-advocacy/law-profs-antitrust-
enforcers-rein-super-platforms-look-upstream/ [https://perma.cc/SV8H-Q34R] (associating 
the decline in average income for authors to the growing monopsony power of Amazon over 
book publishers). 
 9.  See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and 
Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 2 (2015) (offering statistics on the growth of 
inequality); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust 
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 265 (2017) (stating 
that firms in concentrated markets, as opposed to competitive markets, can obtain political 
influence to support favorable policy). 
 10.  See, e.g., Stacy Mitchell, The View from the Shop—Antitrust and the Decline of 
America’s Independent Businesses, 61 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 498, 502 (2016) (noting the 
decrease in small businesses, and the corresponding increase in large corporations in 
government policy, from 1997-2012). 
 11.  See, e.g., Warren, supra note 3, at 3 (“The larger and more economically powerful 
these companies get, the more resources they can bring to bear on lobbying government to 
change the rules to benefit exactly the companies that are doing the lobbying.  Over time, 
this means a closed, self-perpetuating, rigged system – a playing field that lavishes favors on 
the big guys, hammers the small guys, and fuels even more concentration.”) 
 12.  Warren, supra note 3, at 5-6; David Dayen, Bring Back Antitrust, THE AM.
PROSPECT (Nov. 9, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/bring-back-antitrust-0 
[https://perma.cc/356M-SMAZ]; Kevin Drum, Our Four-Decade Antitrust Experiment Has 
Failed, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2016/03/ 
our-four-decade-antitrust-experiment-has-failed [https://perma.cc/2BQ7-VJV4]. 
 13.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION: WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY
2006-2015 5-6 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download 
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have applied these laws to focus narrowly on the neoclassical concept of 
allocative efficiency and adopted defendant-friendly legal standards.14  This 
constricted focus contradicts the broad economic, political, and social 
purposes of antitrust laws.  A body of law that could historically be 
characterized as “a comprehensive charter of economic liberty”15 and “the 
Magna Carta of free enterprise”16 has been reduced to a technocratic field 
with limited reach. 
While the courts could and should reinterpret the antitrust laws to 
accord with Congress’s vision in 1890 and 1914 through the common law 
process, this judicial restoration, even under the best of circumstances, is 
sure to be a slow process.  Given the conservative composition of the 
courts, in particular the Supreme Court, reinterpretation of the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts does not seem imminent.  Many liberal judges have accepted, 
in large measure, the efficiency-oriented antitrust that has been dominant 
for nearly forty years.  For example, Justice Breyer17 and even liberal icon 
Justice Brennan18 authored or joined notable opinions that advanced the 
project to curtail antitrust law.  Even if President Obama had appointed 
Merrick Garland and established a liberal majority on the Supreme Court, 
the Court would likely not have ushered in an antitrust revival.19  And now 
with Justice Gorsuch succeeding Justice Scalia,20 the Supreme Court is 
[https://perma.cc/EYB6-DLAL] (noting that from 2006 to 2015, the Bush and Obama 
administrations together filed just one monopolization suit, and the number of merger cases 
filed annually remained about the same). 
 14.  See Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—Retrospective and 
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 
(1987) (detailing the development of the pro-defendant approaches of federal judges and 
executive branch officials). 
 15.  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 16.  United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 17.  E.g., Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 264 (2007) (holding 
that “securities law implicitly precludes the application of the antitrust laws to the conduct 
alleged in this case”); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 
U.S. 312, 318, 326 (2007) (applying a heightened standard to a predatory-bidding claim and 
holding that the standard was not met). 
 18.  E.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340, 346 (1990) 
(citation omitted) (finding that the plaintiff had suffered “no ‘antitrust injury’”)); Cargill, 
Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986) (finding that the plaintiff did not 
sufficiently allege “a threat of antitrust injury” caused by predatory pricing).
 19.  See Michael D. Shear et al., Obama Chooses Merrick Garland for Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obama-
supreme-court-nominee.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5BCU-587Y] (citing Charles 
Chamberlain as stating that Garland was a nominee “seemingly designed to appease 
intransigent Republicans”). 
 20.  Roert Barnes & Ashley Parker, Neil M. Gorsuch Sworn in as 113th Supreme Court 
Justice, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
courts_law/gorsuch-to-be-sworn-in-to-supreme-court-today-in-two-
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likely to cabin antitrust law even further.21
Under progressive leadership, one federal agency, the FTC, could 
resurrect antitrust law as “a comprehensive charter of economic liberty.”22
Modern administrative law and Congressional delegation of policymaking 
authority grant the FTC expansive power to interpret the antitrust provision 
of Section 5 of the FTC Act.23  In enacting this statute, Congress articulated 
a grand progressive-populist vision of antitrust.  It wanted the FTC to 
police “unfair methods of competition” that injure consumers, prevent 
rivals from competing on the merits, and allow large corporations to 
dominate our political system.24  Congress intended the FTC’s antitrust 
authority to encompass more than the prohibitions in the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts and to nip anticompetitive problems in the embryonic stage 
before corporations gained undue power over consumers, small suppliers, 
competitors, and the American political system.25
Since the early 1980s, the FTC has championed antitrust law centered 
on economic efficiency.  In 2015, the FTC codified this approach in a 
Statement of Enforcement Principles laying out its interpretation of Section 
5’s prohibition on unfair methods of competition.26  The FTC stated that it 
would use its Section 5 authority to advance “consumer welfare,” which is 
functionally similar to the allocative efficiency goal, and apply the rule of 
reason framework.27  In articulating this narrow interpretation of Section 5, 
the FTC contradicted Congress’s political economic vision in 1914, which 
sought to prevent not only short-term injuries to consumers, but also 
exclusionary practices by large businesses and the accumulation of private 
ceremonies/2017/04/10/9ac361fe-1ddb-11e7-ad74-3a742a6e93a7_story.html?utm_
term=.719f53c85f19 [https://perma.cc/5UGA-EQRS]. 
 21.  Zephyr Teachout, Neil Gorsuch Sides with Big Business, Big Donors and Big 
Bosses, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/ 
2017/02/21/neil-gorsuch-always-sides-with-big-business-big-donors-and-big-
bosses/?utm_term=.959433de0043 [https://perma.cc/B5VV-4GDT]; see, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1075 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that a monopolist’s refusal 
to deal is actionable under the antitrust laws only if the monopolist sacrificed profits in the 
process).
 22.  N. Pac. Ry Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 23.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair 
Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 57,056, 57,056 (Sep. 21, 2015) [hereinafter “Section 5 Statement”] (stating that 
Congress “left the development of Section 5 to the Federal Trade Commission as an expert 
administrative body”). 
 24.  Id.
 25.  Id.
 26.  Id.  Section 5 also prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”  15 U.S.C. § 
45(a) (2006).  This Article will focus exclusively on the FTC’s “unfair methods of 
competition” authority. 
 27.  Section 5 Statement, supra note 23.
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political power.  And in making the rule of reason the centerpiece of its 
analytical framework, the FTC adopted a convoluted test that cannot 
advance the Congressional vision underlying Section 5. 
Despite being a champion of the efficiency paradigm since 1981, the 
FTC under progressive leadership in the future could still change course 
and be true to the Congressional intent from when the agency was created 
more than a century ago.  In setting out an interpretation of Section 5, 
whether through enforcement actions or rulemakings, the FTC should 
anchor Section 5 in the expansive political economic vision of Congress.  
By enacting the FTC Act, Congress sought to prevent—rather than remedy 
after the fact—three principal harms from concentrated economic power: 
wealth transfers from consumers and producers to monopolies, oligopolies, 
and cartels; private blockades against entry and competition in markets; 
and the accumulation of economic and political power in corporate hands.  
To advance Congress’s antitrust vision, the FTC should adopt 
presumptions of illegality for a variety of competitively suspicious conduct, 
such as mergers in concentrated industries, exclusionary practices by firms 
with market dominance or near-dominance, and restraints on retail 
competition; and challenge monopolies and oligopolies that inflict 
significant harm on the public.  When seeking to preserve or restore 
competitive market structures, the FTC should pursue simple structural 
remedies over complicated behavioral fixes. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines modern 
administrative law and Congressional intent to show that the FTC has 
broad power to interpret Section 5.  Part II describes the expansive political 
economic vision—one focused on preventing the rise of concentrated 
private power—that Congress had when it enacted the FTC Act in 1914.  
Part III turns to recent FTC policymaking on Section 5.  It explains how the 
Commission, by endorsing the consumer welfare goal and rule of reason 
framework in its 2015 Statement of Enforcement Principles, failed to honor 
Congressional intent.  Part IV lays out an interpretation of Section 5 that is 
rooted in Congressional intent and that would advance the three primary 
goals expressed in the legislative history of the FTC Act.  Part V responds 
to likely objections to the proposed interpretation of Section 5. 
I. THE FTC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DEFINE THE MEANING OF 
SECTION 5
The FTC has broad power to define the meaning of Section 5.  
Modern administrative law gives executive and independent agencies 
considerable freedom to define the meaning of statutes phrased in general 
terms.  A body of law, originating with the Supreme Court’s landmark 
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1984 decision Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,28 has granted elastic quasi-legislative power to the administrative state.  
The Court held in Chevron that agencies have power to interpret 
ambiguously worded statutes so long as the interpretation is reasonable.29
Section 5 of the FTC Act, with its language on “unfair methods of 
competition,” is the type of generally worded statute that an agency is 
empowered to interpret.30
In addition to interpretive authority under Chevron, when Congress 
enacted the FTC Act in 1914, it expressly granted the Commission the 
power to define the meaning of “unfair methods of competition.”  Congress 
was reacting to the Supreme Court decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States in which the Court held that it had the ultimate power to interpret the 
Sherman Act.31  In delegating the power to define “unfair methods of 
competition” to the FTC, Congress sought to reassert control over the 
development of antitrust policy and prevent the courts from subverting 
legislative desires. 
A. Modern Administrative Law Gives the FTC Broad Discretion to 
Interpret Section 5 
Modern administrative law has transferred significant lawmaking 
power from the courts to the numerous executive and independent agencies 
in the federal government.  Questions of statutory interpretation that were 
once the jealous prerogative of the courts are now often resolved by, for 
example, the Department of Labor, the Environmental Protection Agency, 
or the Federal Communications Commission.  While agency statutory 
interpretations are still subject to judicial review, interpretations of statutes 
phrased in general terms are examined under a deferential legal standard. 
The Supreme Court’s Chevron decision revolutionized administrative 
law and policymaking in the United States.  In reviewing a challenge to an 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Court established a deferential standard of review for agency 
interpretations of statutes.  The Court held that an agency’s interpretation 
of a statute would be accorded deference if the statute is ambiguously 
 28.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 29.  Id. at 842-45. 
 30.  Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Chevron and the Limits of Administrative Antitrust, 76 U.
PITT. L. REV. 209, 248 (2014); Royce Zeisler, Chevron Deference and the FTC: How and 
Why the FTC Should Use Chevron to Improve Antitrust Enforcement, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 266, 291-92 (2014). 
 31.  221 U.S. 1, 69-70 (1911). 
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worded and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.32  In practice, 
Chevron deference has meant that an agency’s interpretation is permissible 
unless the statute’s language expressly forecloses this particular 
interpretation.33 Chevron deference represents a transfer of power from the 
courts to the executive branch.  Statutes that were traditionally interpreted 
by the federal courts are now often given meaning by federal agencies.34
The Court in Chevron justified this transfer of lawmaking and 
policymaking functions to agencies on multiple grounds.  First, open-ended 
statutory language presumably reflects a desire on the part of Congress for 
agencies to interpret the statute.35  Second, the Court stated that agencies 
are better equipped than the courts, both in terms of expertise and 
resources, to decide the technical questions often implicated in statutory 
interpretation.36  Third, the Court stated that agency heads, while they are 
not selected by popular vote, do answer to the democratically elected 
president.37  As such, agencies face more public accountability than federal 
judges with life tenure. 
An agency’s interpretation of a statute does not have to be articulated 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking to receive Chevron deference.  
Agencies have broad discretion over the policy instrument that they use to 
articulate interpretations of a statute.38  While notice-and-comment 
rulemakings are one of the most common means of propounding an 
interpretation of a statute, interpretations made through formal 
adjudications are also typically entitled to Chevron deference.39  Whether 
Chevron deference applies to interpretations made through other means, 
such as policy statements, is decided on a case-by-case basis.40
 32.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45. 
 33.  Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA.
L. REV. 597, 601 (2009). 
 34.  See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 833 (2006) (exploring the 
connection between the rate at which judges validate agency interpretations and their 
political ideologies). 
 35.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
 36.  Id. at 865. 
 37.  Id.
 38.  See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (“[T]he Board is not 
precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and . . . the choice 
between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board’s 
discretion.”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made 
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies 
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”). 
 39.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001). 
 40.  Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step 
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 218 (2006). 
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Agencies also have the power to revise and reverse earlier statutory 
interpretations.  The Supreme Court decision in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services41 upheld a 
significant change in the Federal Communications Commission’s 
interpretation of a statutory provision.  Provided they offer a reasoned 
explanation for the changed interpretation, agencies’ revised interpretations 
of a statute are entitled to Chevron deference.42  Agencies are thereby not 
bound by prior interpretations.  They have the power to interpret and 
reinterpret ambiguously phrased statutes over time.  Recently, the Supreme 
Court granted agencies procedural flexibility on revisiting interpretive 
rules, policy statements, and other regulatory interpretations that were not 
made through notice-and-comment rulemaking.  In Perez v. Mortgage 
Bankers Ass’n, the Court held that agencies can subsequently revise these 
less formal interpretations without going through the notice-and-comment 
process.43
The FTC’s interpretation of Section 5’s prohibition on unfair methods 
of competition is almost certain to receive Chevron deference.  The words 
“unfair methods of competition” are not self-defining and susceptible to 
multiple interpretations.  These words are open-ended in content and, on 
their face, allow for a broad range of permissible interpretations.  One 
scholar has succinctly captured how nebulous Section 5 is: “Nearly every 
word of the statute is rife with ambiguity: What is unfair?  Unfair to 
whom? . . . What is a method? . . . What is competition?”44  In light of its 
wording, Section 5 appears to be the paradigmatic example of a statute 
whose interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. 
B. Congress in 1914 Expressly Delegated Power to the FTC to 
Interpret Section 5 
Congress, in creating the FTC, expressly sought to empower the 
agency to define the meaning of “unfair methods of competition.”  The 
Congress that enacted the FTC Act was reacting to the Supreme Court’s 
landmark ruling in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.45  In this decision, the 
Court had established the rule of reason as the framework for analyzing 
most trade restraints and held that it had the power to articulate the 
meaning of the Sherman Act.46  Congress passed the FTC Act to reestablish 
 41.  545 U.S. 967, 1000-01 (2005). 
 42.  Id. at 981-82; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009). 
 43.  135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015). 
 44.  Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 248-49. 
 45.  221 U.S. 1, 69-70 (1911). 
 46.  Id.
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control over the development of competition policy and accordingly 
delegated the authority to define unfair methods of competition to the FTC.  
In light of this history, the FTC could arguably claim that its interpretation 
of Section 5 is entitled to deference, even in the absence of Chevron.47
The Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Oil generated much public 
and congressional outrage.  Although the Court had found the oil refining 
giant liable for monopolization and ordered the dissolution of the company, 
the Court also implicitly claimed the prerogative of interpreting the 
Sherman Act under the rule of reason framework.48  The decision was seen 
as a power grab by the Court.49  The courts were anti-populist and pro-big 
business and routinely struck down federal and state public interest 
regulation that protected ordinary Americans.50  Given this elitist 
orientation of the federal courts, many feared that the rule of reason meant 
the evisceration of the Sherman Act.51  The holding in Standard Oil was a 
major step in this direction as it established, in the common law of the 
Sherman Act, two classes of monopolies: bad monopolies and good 
monopolies.52
In the wake of the 1912 election that involved passionate debates and 
 47.  For an example of the Court granting deference to an agency interpretation of a 
statute on account of express Congressional delegation of authority, see Schweiker v. Gray 
Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981) (citation omitted) (“In view of this explicit delegation of 
substantive authority, the Secretary’s definition [of the contested term] . . . is entitled to 
‘legislative effect’ because, ‘in a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, 
rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term.’”).  
But see, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 137 (2d. Cir 1984) (“As 
the Commission moves away from attacking conduct that is either a violation of the antitrust 
laws of collusive, coercive, predatory, restrictive or deceitful, and seeks to break new 
ground by enjoining otherwise legitimate practices, the closer must be our scrutiny upon 
judicial review.”). 
 48.  Dow Votaw, Antitrust in 1914: The Climate of Opinion, 24 ABA SEC. OF 
ANTITRUST L. 14, 20-21 (1964). 
 49.  Id. at 21; Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 231 (1980).  Justice 
Harlan in his dissent accused his colleagues in the majority of seizing legislative powers for 
the Supreme Court. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 50.  E.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down a ban on yellow-
dog contracts), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a law that limited the number of 
hours that bakery employees could work), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 
U.S. 726 (1963); K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political 
Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 1329, 1329-30 (2016). 
 51.  Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, 
and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 13-14 (2003). 
 52.  Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, The Good and Bad Trust Dichotomy: A 
Short History of a Legal Idea, 35 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 57, 80 (1990). 
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competing visions of antitrust,53 Congress sought to reclaim authority over 
competition policy.  Among those who favored additional antitrust 
legislation, a significant policy disagreement existed.  Some supported a 
law that would prohibit a list of problematic practices, while others 
endorsed a general prohibition on anticompetitive behavior, akin to what 
Congress had done earlier with the Sherman Act.54  A statute that 
prohibited enumerated practices would provide greater legal guidance and 
certainty for businesses.55  It, however, would almost certainly be under-
inclusive56 and susceptible to evasion over time, as profit-oriented 
businesses found new ways to engage in anticompetitive behavior.57
Congress ultimately pursued both options: it passed the Clayton Act that 
prohibited particular practices and the FTC Act that outlawed unfair 
methods of competition in general.58
Congress created the FTC to maintain control over the meaning of 
unfair methods of competition and granted the Commission interpretive 
authority.  Without the Commission, the members of Congress and 
Senators involved in drafting the FTC Act feared that the courts would 
apply a restrictive “judicial gloss” on unfair methods of competition.59
Congress created the Commission “to exercise a legislative function to the 
extent of determining what constitutes an unfair method of competition.”60
The FTC was created to act, in effect, as an arm of Congress that would use 
its expertise and investigatory powers to advance the legislative will.  
Laying out a vision of political accountability, Senator Newlands wanted a 
new commission to be “the servant of Congress.”61  Senator Cummins 
stressed the political accountability of a commission and touted the 
superiority of “a commission at all times under the power of Congress, at 
all times under the eye of the people” over “the comparative seclusion of 
the courts.”62
To guard further against judicial encroachment in the interpretation of 
 53.  See generally Daniel A. Crane, All I Really Need to Know About Antitrust I 
Learned in 1912, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2025 (2015) (noting that debates about the benefits of a 
competitive economy were pervasive in the rhetoric of the 1912 presidential candidates). 
 54.  Winerman, supra note 51, at 3-5. 
 55.  See, e.g., Winerman, supra note 51, at 52, 74 (noting that President Wilson in his 
1912 campaign had promoted a statute with specific prohibitions and that proponents of the 
FTC Act believed in the value of a generally-worded prohibition). 
 56.  Winerman, supra note 51, at 67. 
 57.  Averitt, supra note 49, at 234. 
 58.  15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3, 7 (2015); 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2015). 
 59.  Averitt, supra note 49, at 230, 236; Winerman, supra note 51, at 76. 
 60.  A. Everette MacIntyre & Joachim J. Volhard, The Federal Trade Commission and 
Incipient Unfairness, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 407, 416 (1973). 
 61.  47 CONG. REC. 1225 (1911). 
 62.  51 CONG. REC. 13047 (1914). 
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Section 5, Congress took another important step.  The drafters of the FTC 
Act adopted the term of art “unfair methods of competition.”63  Initial drafts 
used the established term “unfair competition.”64  This term was (and still 
is) associated with a large body of common law concerning businesses 
passing off their goods as those of a rival,65 rather than anticompetitive 
practices.  Using the term “unfair competition” and indirectly invoking the 
related precedent in the statute raised the specter of the courts once again 
thwarting congressional will.  Members of Congress feared that courts 
would use this language to assert authority to interpret Section 5 and, in 
particular, apply the precedent on “unfair competition” to narrow what 
Congress intended to be an expansive statute.66
The Supreme Court has recognized the policymaking power that 
Congress granted to the FTC.  In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., the 
Court observed that Congress wanted to preserve interpretive flexibility 
when it prohibited unfair methods of competition.67  The Court stated that 
Congress, by design, declined to anchor “the concept of unfairness to a 
common-law or statutory standard or by enumerating the particular 
practices to which it was intended to apply.”68  As such, unfair methods of 
competition are not limited to acts that may violate the other antitrust 
statutes.69  In affirming the Commission’s broad policymaking power, the 
Court held that the FTC “does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in 
measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated 
standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values 
beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of 
the antitrust laws.”70  A subsequent Supreme Court decision affirmed the 
Commission’s power to define unfair methods of competition.71
II. IN ENACTING THE FTC ACT, CONGRESS HAD AN EXPANSIVE 
VISION FOR SECTION 5
The Congress that enacted the FTC Act and created the Commission 
had an ambitious progressive-populist vision for the new agency.  It 
 63.  Averitt, supra note 49, at 235. 
 64.  Averitt, supra note 49, at 235. 
 65.  Averitt, supra note 49, at 235. 
 66.  Averitt, supra note 49, at 235.  Supporters of the FTC Act had much less faith in 
the courts than those who believed the Sherman Act’s rule of reason was sufficient to 
control monopoly power.  Winerman, supra note 51, at 76. 
 67.  405 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1972). 
68.  Id.
 69.  Id. at 244. 
 70.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 71.  FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1986). 
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established an agency with enforcement, research, and policymaking 
powers.  In granting the agency the power to prohibit the open-ended 
“unfair methods of competition,” Congress expressed expansive political 
economic aims that should guide the Commission’s exercise of its powers.  
Congress aimed to protect consumers and producers from wealth-extracting 
firms with market power, preserve open markets for all comers, and 
prevent the concentration of private power. Congress had expressed similar 
objectives in enacting the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
Section 5 was meant to be narrower in some respects than the other 
two principal antitrust statutes—and broader in others.  Unlike the 
substantive provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, Section 5 lacks a 
private right of action or a treble damages remedy.72  Congress, however, 
intended it to reach a wider array of conduct than the other two antitrust 
statutes.  Importantly, Congress wanted Section 5 to be an incipiency 
statute, which nips anticompetitive practices in the bud and prevents 
monopolies and oligopolies from developing in the first place. 
A. Section 5 of the FTC Act Has a Multifaceted Political Economic 
Purpose
Congress, in creating the FTC, had an ambitious vision for its Section 
5 powers.  While the term “unfair methods of competition” is vague and 
susceptible to multiple interpretations, the legislative debates culminating 
in the passage of the FTC Act reveal three central purposes.  The members 
of Congress involved in drafting and passing the FTC Act wanted to 
protect consumers from wealth transfers, maintain markets open to all 
comers, and prevent the concentration of private economic and political 
power.  These goals are remarkably similar to those expressed in the 
debates leading up to the enactment of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.73
Congress enacted the antitrust laws in response to growing public fears 
about and hostility toward the large-scale corporate entities that emerged in 
 72.  Amy Marshak, The Federal Trade Commission on the Frontier: Suggestions for 
the Use of Section 5, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1128 (2011). 
 73.  See generally Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) 
(noting that the floor debates over federal antitrust legislation suggest that Congress 
“condemned monopolies”); James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and 
Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OH. ST. L.J. 257 
(1989) (discussing legislators’ conflicting views on concentrated capitalism in the early 
twentieth century).  Congress reaffirmed this broad vision in subsequent antitrust statutes.  
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., The Future of Antitrust: Ideology Vs. Legislative Intent, 35 ANTITRUST
BULL. 575, 583-88 (1990). 
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the decades following the Civil War.74  Contrary to Robert Bork and other 
conservative thinkers, the legislative histories of the FTC Act do not show 
a concern with promoting economic efficiency as defined by neoclassical 
economics, or even an awareness of the concept.75
The legislative debates reveal a widely shared anger toward large 
businesses that used their power to extract wealth from consumers and 
producers and a desire for the FTC to prevent this type of redistribution.  
Several members of Congress and Senators expressed outrage at how 
corporations could use their power in the market to raise prices and capture 
the wealth of the consuming public.  As Robert Lande has shown, the 
prevention of redistribution through the exercise of market power was an 
important objective.76  Congress sought to prevent large corporations from 
using their power to deprive consumers of the benefits of technical progress 
and producers of the fruits of their labor.  A sample of quotes from the 
legislative debate underscores the importance of this goal.  The principal 
sponsor of the FTC Act in the Senate condemned “unreasonable and 
extortionate prices.”77  A colleague, Senator Lane, stated that Americans 
are “being compelled to pay arbitrarily fixed and unjustly high prices for 
what they consume [and that] they are being robbed.”78  Representative 
Morgan expressed hope that the FTC would “minimize the power of the 
large industrial corporation to concentrate wealth . . . and secure the people 
from unjust tribute levied by monopolistic corporations.”79  A House report 
noted that powerful purchasers (monopsonies and oligopsonies in modern 
economic terms) could similarly use their power to depress prices paid to 
employees and other small producers.80
 74.  See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219, 1226 (1988) (“The advent of big business on this massive scale was a traumatic event.  
‘[T]he old gentry, the merchants of long standing, the small manufacturers, the established 
professional men, the civic leaders of an earlier era’ saw themselves deprived of economic 
power, opportunity, personal independence, and social status.  This urban middle class, the 
backbone of the progressive reform movement, was profoundly antagonistic to big business, 
and no one complained more bitterly than the owners of small businesses.  Agrarian 
populism also identified big business, particularly the great railroad combinations, with the 
farmer’s increasingly tenuous control over his livelihood.  Labor sought strength in 
collective organization to protect itself from the power of massed capit Thus, a broad 
spectrum of American society complained bitterly about the evil powers of the trusts.”). 
 75.  Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2275 
(2013) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
427 (rev. ed. 1993). 
 76.  Lande, supra note 73, at 112-14. 
 77.  S. REP. NO. 63-597, at § 7 (1914). 
 78.  51 CONG. REC. 13223 (1914). 
 79.  Id. at 8854. 
 80.  H.R. REP. NO. 63-533, pt. 1, at 14 (1914). 
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The Congressional debates also indicate a commitment to preserving 
the openness of markets to all parties.  Several members of Congress and 
Senators expressed fear that large corporations would use their power to 
exclude smaller rivals from the market.  Senator Reed stated this 
commitment to open markets eloquently: “We are trying to keep the 
highways of opportunity unobstructed.  We are trying to keep it so that the 
feet of the men of today may travel along an open path, so that all may 
have a fair chance to gain a livelihood and to embark in business.”81
In expressing this desire to maintain open markets, Senator Reed was 
far from alone among his peers.  Senator Burton sought to ensure “a free 
field for all” in business and warned against irresistible corporate power 
under which “equality of opportunity shall be destroyed or the deserving 
competitor driven out of business.”82  Senator Lane worried that, without 
the FTC, the typical small enterprise would be “driven out of business by 
his larger or more crafty rival.”83
The fears about concentrated economic and political power and indeed 
private autocracy were another important theme in the legislative debates.  
The threat to democratic institutions from concentrated private power had 
been a recurring motivation in enacting the other antitrust statutes.84
Senator Kenyon stated: “[I]f this Government is powerless to destroy 
monopoly, then we have got to concede that monopoly is powerful enough 
to destroy this Government.”85  A House Minority Report lamented how 
“[f]ifty men in the United States control, through interlocking directorates, 
forty percent of the wealth of the country.”86  Congressman Stevens 
observed that: “vast wealth has been accumulated, especially in the hands 
of a few, irresponsible except to their own consciences and sense of justice 
and patriotism” and noted that “the great mass of our people have a very 
just apprehension that this wealth, and [the] power growing out of it . . . 
may be a potential source of injury and oppression.”87  He endorsed the 
creation of an FTC because it would guard the public against this 
concentration of private power.88  Senator Cummins even raised the 
possibility of corporate dictatorship.  He warned his colleagues against 
valuing cheap goods and services too highly “if it involves the surrender of 
the individual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a single master 
 81.  51 CONG. REC. 13231 (1914). 
 82.  Id. at 14792. 
 83.  Id. at 13223. 
 84.  May, supra note 73, at 296-97. 
 85.  51 CONG. REC. 13158 (1914). 
 86.  H.R. REP. NO. 63-533, pt. 3, at 5 (1914). 
 87.  51 CONG. REC. 8850 (1914). 
 88.  Id. at 14938. 
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mind.”89
B. Section 5 Is Intended to Be Broader than the Other Antitrust Laws 
While the legislative themes underlying the FTC Act bear a close 
resemblance to those underlying its sister antitrust laws, the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts,90 Congress aimed to go further in some important ways when 
it established the FTC.  Neil Averitt’s landmark article on Section 5 laid 
out several possible interpretations, which ranged from a statute that is 
coterminous with the other antitrust laws to one that allows the FTC to 
police virtually all types of business conduct.91  Among these 
interpretations, an uncontroversial one is that Section 5 is intended, like the 
Clayton Act, to be an incipient measure that prevents competitive problems 
before they have come to fruition.92  In other words, Section 5 has a strong 
prophylactic orientation. 
This incipiency theme is evident in the legislative debates.  Indeed, 
Congress and many members of the public were frustrated with the 
Sherman Act’s inability to tackle nascent threats to competition.93  After-
the-fact legal action was seen as unable to address monopolies.94  Once a 
corporation became a monopoly, it became difficult to restructure the 
market and restore competition.  To maintain competitive markets, early 
and decisive legal action against anticompetitive conduct was considered 
essential.  President Wilson also championed a preventative approach to 
antitrust policy.95
Averitt has noted that “[t]he legislative history of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act is replete with references which reiterate that the function 
of the Commission would be to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency.”96
 89.  Id. at 12742. 
 90.  See generally Lande, supra note 73, at 82-142 (discussing the similar congressional 
goals of economic efficiency and protecting consumers from unfair wealth transfers behind 
the various antitrust laws); May, supra note 73, at 288-300 (noting the “widespread 
congressional commitment to the long-established ideals of economic opportunity, security 
of property, freedom of exchange, and political liberty”). 
 91.  See Averitt, supra note 49, at 238-96. 
 92.  Id. at 242-51. 
 93.  See Averitt, supra note 49, at 243 (noting the importance of stopping antitrust 
violations in their incipiency); see also Winerman, supra note 51, at 74 (discussing the 
congressional support for stopping anticompetitive acts at the start). 
 94.  See MacIntyre & Volhard, supra note 60, at 414 (emphasizing the difficulties in 
addressing antitrust issues once a trend of concentration had already become evident). 
 95.  Id. at 414 n.39 (noting President Wilson’s belief that stopping anticompetitive acts 
in their incipiency would help small businessmen have a place in the market). 
 96.  Averitt, supra note 49, at 243 (citing MacIntyre & Volhard, supra note 60, at 414-
15).
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 76 S
ide B
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 76 Side B      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
4_VAHEESAN_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:34 PM
662 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:3 
The Conference Committee report stressed this theme of prevention.97
Senator Reed stated that the goal was “to strike those [anticompetitive] acts 
in their incipiency instead of after they have been actually worked out into 
a complete system of monopoly or restraint of trade.”98  Similarly, Senator 
Newlands sought to check monopoly “in the embryo.”99  Senator Cummins 
aspired “to seize the offender before his ravages”100 had violated existing 
antitrust rules, and Representative Covington sounded a similar theme and 
stated that “[w]hat we wish to do and ought to do above everything else is 
to prevent the growth of monopoly at the beginning.”101
The courts have affirmed the incipiency standard in Section 5.  While 
the judiciary has not addressed incipiency—or even Section 5 more 
generally—in decades, the most recent decisions are unequivocal that 
Section 5 is intended to prevent anticompetitive behavior in its infancy.  
The Supreme Court has stated that Section 5 is intended “to stop in their 
incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate [the 
antitrust] Acts”102 and that “Congress enacted § 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act to combat in their incipiency trade practices that exhibit a 
strong potential for stifling competition.”103  In Fashion Originators Guild 
v. FTC, the Supreme Court similarly acknowledged this legislative purpose 
behind the FTC Act, stating that the sponsors hoped “that its effect might 
be prophylactic and that through it attempts to bring about complete 
monopolization of an industry might be stopped in their incipiency.”104
The courts have held that the Section 5 incipiency standard applies in 
cases that implicate the Clayton Act, which has its own incipiency 
standard.105  Among other things, the Clayton Act covers mergers and 
exclusive dealing in the sale of goods.106  In FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., the 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the Commission 
must show a substantial likelihood of harm to competition.107  Instead, the 
Court held that the FTC “has power under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in 
 97.  See H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (stressing the importance of stopping 
monopolies at the outset). 
 98.  51 CONG. REC. 13118 (1914). 
 99.  Id. at 12030.
 100.  Id. at 11455.
 101.  Id. at 14941.
 102.  FTC v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953). 
 103.  FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 225 (1968). 
 104.  312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941). 
 105.  Averitt, supra note 49, at 246-47. 
 106.  15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (2015). 
 107.  See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966) (rejecting the argument that 
outright proof of a Section 3 Clayton violation is necessary for a Section 5 FTC Act 
violation).
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their incipiency without proof that they amount to an outright violation of § 
3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws.”108
III. THE FTC’S 2015 AFFIRMATION OF A LIMITED ANTITRUST
THAT CONTRAVENES CONGRESS’ GOALS
The FTC has interpreted Section 5 narrowly in recent decades.  The 
Commission’s expansive interpretation of Section 5 in the mid-twentieth 
century is a distant memory in 2017.  The FTC suffered three appellate 
defeats in Section 5 matters in the early 1980s,109 which appear to have 
instilled a multi-decade timidity.  For the past thirty years, the Commission 
has invoked Section 5 infrequently in litigation and settlements and has 
been rather modest when it has.  When the Commission has brought stand-
alone Section 5 actions in the intervening years, these cases have 
represented only marginal extensions of existing Sherman Act precedent.110
None of these actions have questioned the framework of contemporary 
antitrust or sought to broaden its normative lens.  While the FTC’s Section 
5 antitrust authority has not been strengthened since the three appellate 
losses in the 1980s, these cases preceded the Chevron revolution in 
administrative law.111
Just as monopoly, economic power, and antitrust reemerged as a topic 
of public debate, the FTC, in its 2015 Statement of Enforcement Principles, 
voluntarily limited the scope of its power and affirmed its commitment to 
the antitrust status quo.112  The Section 5 Statement endorses a limited 
policy program that fails to reflect Congress’ vision in establishing the 
Commission.  The FTC stated that consumer welfare would be the guiding 
principle in its Section 5 actions and that the rule of reason would be the 
default analytical framework in such cases.113  In establishing consumer 
 108.  Id.
 109.  See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 142 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(vacating the FTC’s order finding manufacturers of gasoline additives had conducted unfair 
competition methods); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 928 (2d Cir. 
1980) (reversing an order from the FTC forcing publisher of airline schedules to publish 
certain connecting flights); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(denying enforcement of an FTC order holding that manufacturers of plywood violated the 
FTC Act by using a delivered pricing system). 
 110.  See, e.g., Complaint at *9-12, In re Negotiated Data Sols. LLC, F.T.C. No. 51-
0094, 2008 F.T.C. LEXIS 119 (Sept. 22, 2008) (alleging patent holder reneged on licensing 
commitment following commercialization of technical standard that included patent); In re 
Valassis Commc’ns, Inc., 141 F.T.C. 247, 249-52 (2006) (alleging invitation to collude). 
 111.  Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 254. 
 112.  See Section 5 Statement, 80 Fed. Reg. at 57,056 (stating that Section 5 would track 
judicial interpretations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts where applicable). 
 113.  Id.
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welfare as the sole objective of Section 5 enforcement, the FTC elevated 
the conservative ideology and false historical analysis of Robert Bork and 
other Chicago School academics over Congress’s intent in creating the 
Commission.  Congress wanted to advance a broad political economic 
vision and prevent monopolies and oligopolies from emerging, rather than 
wait to attack them after they had become entrenched.  In addition to 
defining the goal of Section 5 too narrowly, the FTC endorsed the rule of 
reason, a deficient analytical framework.  In practice, the rule of reason 
confers de facto legality on a range of problematic business conduct. 
A. The FTC Doubled Down on the Ahistorical Efficiency Paradigm 
In its Section 5 Statement, the FTC affirmed its commitment to the 
neoclassical interpretation of antitrust law.  The Commission stated that its 
Section 5 actions would be “guided by the goal of promoting consumer 
welfare.”114  By using this language, the FTC did not present as much 
clarity as it might have thought it did.  In the antitrust world, “consumer 
welfare” is not a settled term and has been the source of a running debate 
between those who believe consumer welfare should cover flesh-and-blood 
consumers and those who believe it should account for the welfare of 
consumers and producers.  Regardless of the interpretation the FTC 
intended to adopt, it failed to honor Congress’s intentions in enacting 
Section 5.  When it passed the FTC Act, Congress viewed the protection of 
consumers as only one of several antitrust goals that the new Commission 
should advance.115
The definition of consumer welfare has been a contentious topic in 
modern antitrust.  One camp, generally associated with conservative 
thinkers (“conservative consumer welfare”), claims that consumer welfare 
means allocative economic efficiency116 and should capture both profits—
the welfare of producers—and consumer wellbeing.117  A group of 
 114.  Id.
 115.  See supra part II.A. 
 116.  Allocative efficiency exists when goods and services are produced up to a point at 
which the marginal benefit to the purchaser equals the marginal cost of production.  If 
antitrust law promotes allocative efficiency, it seeks to police conduct that prevents the 
production of goods and services from reaching the socially optimal level.  This so-called 
deadweight loss means that the marginal benefit from additional output exceeds the 
marginal cost.  Critically, this marginal benefit is tied to a consumer’s willingness and 
ability to pay.  Under the allocative efficiency framework, a wealthy person’s desire for a 
luxury vacation home is accorded more significance than a poor person’s need for lifesaving 
healthcare. See Barak Orbach, Was the Crisis in Antitrust a Trojan Horse?, 79 ANTITRUST
L.J. 881, 893-94 (2013). 
 117.  See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need To Be Modernized?, 21 J. ECON.
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progressive antitrust scholars (“progressive consumer welfare”) argues that 
consumer welfare, as Congress meant it, means protecting consumers from 
the wealth transfers associated with the higher prices from monopolies, 
oligopolies, and cartels.118  Notwithstanding their differences, both 
interpretations are rooted in the logic of neoclassical economics and focus 
on the short-run material effects of market power.119
Progressive consumer welfare has much stronger historical support 
than the conservative conception.  The progressive understanding of 
consumer welfare has deep grounding in the legislative histories of the FTC 
Act as well as the Sherman and Clayton Acts.120  Although they did not 
conceive of antitrust in the technical terms of economics, the members of 
Congress and Senators involved in drafting and debating the FTC Act 
aimed to prevent powerful corporations from exacting overcharges on and 
thereby transferring wealth from the consuming public.121  In contrast, they 
showed no intent to advance the goal of conservative consumer welfare.122
While progressive consumer welfare is anchored in the legislative 
history of the FTC Act, protecting consumers from anticompetitive 
overcharges is only one of the goals that Congress had in creating the 
Commission in 1914.  Congress did not express a solely consumerist 
purpose.  It conceived of the antitrust laws as political and social statutes, 
not pure economic measures.123  Along with preventing powerful 
businesses from exacting wealth from consumers, two other themes 
dominated the debates leading to the passage of the FTC Act.  First, the 
members of Congress who drafted the statute wanted to prevent dominant 
businesses from using their power to drive out smaller rivals and close 
markets to competitors.124  They believed that monopolists and oligopolists 
had to be checked through federal legislation because they had the raw 
PERSPECTIVES 155, 156-59 (2007) (arguing that antitrust laws should maximize total 
surplus, not just consumer surplus). 
 118.  See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust 
Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 336, 336-38 (2009) (placing the emphasis on consumer harm rather than an aggregated 
standard including seller welfare). 
 119.  See John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Policy, “Original Intent” 
and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 264 (1988) 
(noting that both conservative and progressive consumer welfare advocates utilize “latter-
day economic theory” to parse congressional intent in the Sherman Act). 
 120.  See generally Lande, supra note 73 (discussing the desire to prevent unfair wealth 
transfers as a common goal behind the various antitrust statutes). 
 121.  Lande, supra note 73, at 112-13. 
 122.  See Flynn, supra note 119, at 299. 
 123.  Peter C. Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigm of Industrial Organization,
16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 487-88 (1983). 
 124. See supra Section II.a. 
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power to control markets and represented an existential threat to small 
businesses and entrepreneurs.125  Second, the authors of the FTC Act sought 
to forestall concentrations of private power.126  They feared that corporate 
giants threatened to undermine American democracy and transform the 
institutions of the state into their servants.127
In endorsing the language of “consumer welfare,” the Section 5 
Statement failed to honor Congress’s aims in enacting the FTC Act.  At 
best, the FTC fulfilled only one of the goals Congress set out in its 
founding statute.  Even if the Commission embraces progressive consumer 
welfare, it would still not do justice to what Congress intended.  The 
Commission would disregard the other two principal objectives that 
Congress envisioned.  The Section 5 Statement did not acknowledge the 
Congressional aims of maintaining open markets and preventing the 
concentration of private power.  It focused exclusively and narrowly on the 
economic well-being of consumers while ignoring the political and social 
objectives of the FTC Act.  In a speech to announce the publication of the 
Section 5 Statement, Chairwoman Edith Ramirez stressed the focus on 
consumer welfare and seemed to disparage the political and social aims of 
the FTC Act as “public policy concerns unrelated to competition.”128  As 
former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky wrote, this disregard for the 
political goals of antitrust is “bad history, bad policy, and bad law.”129
B. The FTC Endorsed a Legal Standard that Grants Powerful 
Businesses Carte Blanche to Control Markets 
Along with adopting the narrow goal of consumer welfare, the FTC 
stated that its Section 5 cases would rely on “a framework similar to the 
rule of reason.”130  The rule of reason requires a deep investigation of the 
 125. See supra Section II.a. 
 126. See supra Section II.a. 
 127. See supra Section II.a. 
 128.  Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at Competition Law 
Center at George Washington University Law School 5 (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735411/150813section5spee
ch.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAH6-K4E2]. 
 129.  Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 
(1979).
 130.  Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” 
Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 57,056, 57,056 (Sept. 
21, 2015).  Chairwoman Ramirez stated that the rule of reason in the Section 5 Statement 
should be understood in “its broad, modern sense.”  Ramirez, supra note 125, at 7.  She 
added that this means that “the rule of reason does not ‘necessarily . . . call for the fullest 
market analysis’ in all cases.”  Ramirez, supra note 128, at 7.  While the FTC could analyze 
a range of conduct under the truncated rule of reason or even presumptions of illegality, it is 
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relevant industry and credible evidence of actual or likely anticompetitive 
outcomes, defined today to mean higher prices or reduced economic 
output.131  For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case under the rule of 
reason, it must typically show actual or likely anticompetitive effects from 
the conduct being challenged.132  When a plaintiff demonstrates likely 
anticompetitive effects, the defendant has the opportunity to rebut this 
showing through the presentation of efficiencies and other business 
justifications from the conduct.133  The plaintiff can then either rebut the 
justification (restraint does not promote procompetitive benefits or there are 
substantially less restrictive alternatives) or show that the anticompetitive 
effects outweigh the procompetitive benefits.134  Rather than merely 
“similar,” the Section 5 Statement’s high-level description of the rule of 
reason appears to be virtually identical to the long-standing interpretation 
of the rule of reason.135
The rule of reason stands in contrast to per se and presumption of 
illegality.  In the rules versus standards dichotomy, the rule of reason is 
antitrust law’s standards-based framework, whereas presumptive illegality 
and especially per se illegality are more rules-oriented.136  Starting in the 
likely to use simpler iterations of the rule of reason sparingly.  Ramirez emphasized that the 
Section 5 Statement is an expression of continuity with the past, rather than a break with it.  
Ramirez, supra note 128, at 10.  In laying out a streamlined version of the rule of reason, 
Ramirez cites the FTC’s “quick look” rule of reason in the context of conduct resembling 
collusion.  Ramirez, supra note 128, at 8.  This is a telling example.  Over the past three 
decades, the FTC has applied a truncated rule of reason analysis to horizontal restraints on 
price and non-price competition.  See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming FTC’s decision that agreements between competitors to restrict 
price cutting and advertising is inherently suspect).  Elsewhere, the FTC has relied on the 
full-blown rule of reason. See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 842 (11th Cir. 
2015) (upholding FTC’s decision that a monopolist’s exclusive dealing was illegal under a 
full rule of reason analysis).  Treating it as an affirmation of FTC practice over the past 
several decades, the Section 5 Statement should be seen as leaving some space for simpler 
legal standards for collusion-like conduct but requiring full market analysis for mergers, 
monopolies, and vertical restraints. 
 131.  See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-87 
(2007) (identifying the rule of reason as the standard for determining whether a practice 
restrains trade and discussing the factors that are considered). 
 132.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 133.  Id. at 59. 
 134.  Id.
 135.  See Section 5 Statement, 80 Fed. Reg. at 57,056 (“[T]he act or practice will be 
evaluated under a framework similar to the rule of reason, that is, an act or practice 
challenged by the Commission must cause, or be likely to cause, harm to competition or the 
competitive process, taking into account any associated cognizable efficiencies and business 
justifications . . . .”). 
 136.  See generally Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007). 
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late 1970s, the courts, in their antitrust decisions, shifted decisively away 
from rules and toward standards and held that most types of business 
conduct should be analyzed under balancing tests like the rule of reason.137
The federal antitrust agencies have adopted a similar analytical framework, 
one reliant on fact-driven inquiries, for addressing antitrust concerns in 
mergers.138  The Supreme Court has held that the rule of reason is now the 
default analytical tool in antitrust cases.139  Today, only price fixing, market 
division, and bid rigging between rivals remain per se illegal.140
1. The Rule of Reason Is Not Equipped to Advance Consumer 
Welfare 
The rule of reason requires a case-by-case balancing that is beyond the 
capability of federal antitrust enforcers, let alone generalist courts.  For 
example, how can the FTC or a court credibly balance the short-term loss 
of price competition from a horizontal merger against the realization of 
longer-term dynamic efficiencies?141  This task calls for “speculative, 
possibly labyrinthine, and unnecessary”142 analysis and appears to be 
 137.  See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 
312, 314 (2007) (holding that a two-pronged reasonableness test that applied to predatory 
pricing claims also applied to predatory bidding actions); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 
10-15 (1997) (reviewing the Supreme Court’s previous decisions regarding the rule of 
reason and highlighting the reluctance to adopt per se rules). 
 138.  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E623-FVNT] (outlining the analytical techniques used to address antitrust 
concerns following a merger or acquisition). 
 139.  State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10. 
 140.  See Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1998) (summarizing the 
Supreme Court’s decisions with respect to horizontal and vertical price-fixing while 
highlighting its status as per se illegal); see also Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc. 498 U.S. 46, 
49-50 (1990) (finding that a market division agreement between rivals was illegal “on its 
face”).  Some types of collusion-like behavior have been deemed presumptively illegal, 
under the so-called quick look test, in multiple Supreme Court and lower court rulings.  See,
e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984) (stating that a 
demonstration of anticompetitive behavior does not need to rely on “a detailed market 
analysis”); N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that a quick-look analysis was an appropriate way to determine the “net 
anticompetitive effects” were obvious); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding a restraint presumptively unlawful because of obviousness). 
 141.  See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of 
Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1442 (2009) (suggesting that judicial fact-finders are 
not capable of assigning values to short and long term efficiencies because of feasibility and 
consistency concerns). 
 142.  Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV.
59, 87 (2010). 
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beyond the capacities of even the most able institutional actors.  Before the 
adoption of the efficiency paradigm, the Supreme Court cited the practical 
impossibility of measuring and balancing costs and benefits in declining to 
apply the rule of reason to certain types of business conduct.  In United 
States v. Topco Associates, the Court acknowledged its institutional 
limitations when asked to make legislative-type determinations: 
There have been tremendous departures from the notion of a free-
enterprise system as it was originally conceived in this country.  
These departures have been the product of congressional action 
and the will of the people.  If a decision is to be made to sacrifice 
competition in one portion of the economy for greater 
competition in another portion, this too is a decision that must be 
made by Congress and not by private forces or by the courts.  
Private forces are too keenly aware of their own interests in 
making such decisions and courts are ill-equipped and ill-situated 
for such decisionmaking.  To analyze, interpret, and evaluate the 
myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would 
surely be brought to bear on such decisions, and to make the 
delicate judgment on the relative values to society of competitive 
areas of the economy, the judgment of the elected representatives 
of the people is required.143
In more recent times, Justice Breyer has raised similar administrative 
objections to applying the rule of reason to resale price maintenance 
agreements.144
While in theory calling for an impossible intellectual inquiry, the rule 
of reason, in practice, functions as a standard of “de facto legality.”145  By 
 143.  United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611-12 (1972). 
 144.  See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 916 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How easily can courts identify instances in which the 
benefits are likely to outweigh potential harms?  My own answer is, not very easily.  For one 
thing, it is often difficult to identify who—producer or dealer—is the moving force behind 
any given resale price maintenance agreement.  Suppose, for example, several large 
multibrand [sic] retailers all sell resale-price-maintained products.  Suppose further that 
small producers set retail prices because they fear that, otherwise, the large retailers will 
favor (say, by allocating better shelf space) the goods of other producers who practice resale 
price maintenance.  Who ‘initiated’ this practice, the retailers hoping for considerable 
insulation from retail competition, or the producers, who simply seek to deal best with the 
circumstances they find?  For another thing, as I just said, it is difficult to determine just 
when, and where, the ‘free riding’ problem is serious enough to warrant legal protection.”). 
 145.  See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of 
Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (1991) (analyzing how the rule of reason analysis has been 
applied by federal courts of appeals to vertical non-price constraints).  Judge Posner has 
similarly described the rule of reason as a “euphemism for nonliability.”  Richard A. Posner, 
The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977). 
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endorsing the rule of reason, the FTC has given powerful businesses broad 
freedom to dominate markets, whether through mergers, exclusionary 
conduct, or other anticompetitive practices.  The rule of reason imposes 
heavy burdens on plaintiffs and, correspondingly, establishes a strong 
presumption of legality for even competitively suspect conduct by firms 
with market power. 
In adopting the rule of reason, the FTC practically guaranteed that it 
would be able to bring few, if any, Section 5 cases.  The statistics 
demonstrate, in practice, that the rule of reason means that the plaintiff 
almost always loses.  A leading study found that, between 2000 and 2009, 
defendants received a favorable court ruling in more than ninety-five 
percent of antitrust cases implicating the rule of reason.146
In the merger context, a growing body of evidence shows that 
insisting on rule of reason style analysis comes at a significant cost to 
consumers.  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines assume that mergers 
generally enhance efficiency.147  This pro-merger assumption seems to rest 
on a thin bed of evidence.  In the manufacturing sector, mergers, instead of 
creating efficiencies, have led to enhanced market power, as seen in higher 
price-cost markups.148  Furthermore, the assumption that markets with low 
or moderate concentration (as defined by the Horizontal Merger 
 146.  Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st 
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (2009). 
 147.  See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at § 10 (“[A] primary 
benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and 
thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower 
prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”). 
 148.  See Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on 
Market Power and Efficiency 24 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working Paper No. 2016-
082, 2016) (finding significant evidence of increased average markups from M&A activity 
in manufacturing industries); Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and 
Competition Policy, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 833, 873-79 (2011) (discussing sources and 
studies that suggest “certain categories of mergers destroy shareholder value and do little, if 
anything, to create meaningful efficiencies or to enhance market competition”).  See also
Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming More 
Concentrated? 41 (2016) (“This paper documents that over the last 15 years the level of 
product market concentration in the US has increased across most industries. This 
phenomenon has been fueled by consolidation of public firms into mega firms. We show 
that the increase in concentration levels has implications to firm performance, as it affects 
profitability, investment, and returns to investors. First, the increase in industry 
concentration levels is associated with remaining firms generating higher profits through 
higher profit margins. The results suggest that the increase in profit margin cannot be 
attributed to increased efficiency but rather to increased market power. Second, mergers in 
concentrated industries enjoy more positive market reactions, consistent with the idea that 
market power considerations are becoming a key source of value during these corporate 
events. Finally, firms in concentrated industries experience significant abnormal stock 
returns, suggesting that considerable portion of the gains accrues to shareholders.”). 
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Guidelines) are not conducive to collusion149 appears empirically suspect.  
Contrary to this assumption, price fixing and other collusive conduct has 
been uncovered in many unconcentrated markets.150
John Kwoka’s research has raised further questions about whether the 
fact-intensive merger review process promotes consumer welfare.  
Kwoka’s meta-analysis of merger retrospective studies found that the 
antitrust agencies failed to act against more than sixty percent of the 
studied mergers that resulted in price increases.151  In a separate study, 
Kwoka found that simple structural presumptions, such as the market share 
of the merging parties and combined market share of the leading firms, 
have a high rate of accuracy in predicting which mergers lead to short-term 
consumer harm.152  These findings cast doubt on the need for open-ended, 
time-consuming investigations of horizontal mergers in already 
concentrated markets.153
2. The Rule of Reason’s Deficiencies Become Even More Acute 
Under Progressive-Populist Antitrust 
The problems with the rule of reason become only more severe under 
the antitrust goals articulated by Congress.  This progressive-populist 
philosophy seeks to protect consumers and producers from powerful sellers 
and purchasers, maintain open markets, and prevent the accumulation of 
private power.  The rule of reason also fails to advance the incipiency 
standard in Section 5.  Even if the FTC had adopted the goals Congress laid 
out in 1914 in its Section 5 Statement, the rule of reason would foreclose 
 149.  See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at § 5.3 (“Mergers resulting 
in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily 
require no further analysis.”). 
 150.  Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-
First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 555-56 (2007). 
 151.  JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 155 (2014). 
 152.  See John Kwoka, The Structural Presumption and the Safe Harbor in Merger 
Review: False Positives, or Unwarranted Concerns? 48 (Ne. Univ. Dep’t of Econ., 
Working Paper, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2782152 
[https://perma.cc/2KN2-K9SX] (finding that structural presumptions of illegality are highly 
accurate in identifying anticompetitive mergers under the consumer welfare standard). 
 153.  While appearing to fail consumers, the current merger review process is an 
important source of income for economists and lawyers who specialize in merger analysis 
and have experience at one of the federal antitrust agencies. See generally Jesse Eisinger & 
Justin Elliott, These Professors Make More Than a Thousand Bucks an Hour Peddling 
Mega-Mergers, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/these-
professors-make-more-than-thousand-bucks-hour-peddling-mega-mergers
[https://perma.cc/UA6V-KC8P] (discussing the high earnings of professors who are hired 
by large companies to rebut concerns of increased market power from corporate mergers). 
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the realization of these aims. 
The original aims of the FTC Act are not susceptible to quantification 
and balancing.  How could the FTC balance incommensurable things such 
as short-term price effects against enhanced corporate power in the political 
system?  The absurdity of this type of balancing is evident on its face.  
These are qualitative determinations that call for legislative-type 
judgments, not a futile quantification exercise.  The rule of reason compels 
the FTC to focus its lens narrowly: it must concentrate on quantifiable, 
short-term harms (from, for example, mergers) and ignore qualitative and 
longer-term harms in their entirety.154
In eschewing per se rules and presumptions in favor of the rule of 
reason, the FTC also contradicted the incipiency principle of Section 5.  In 
enacting the FTC Act, Congress aspired to prevent monopolies and 
oligopolies from dominating markets in the first place, rather than 
restructure them after they had emerged and become entrenched.155  This 
prophylactic, or incipient, purpose recognized that prevention of 
competitive problems is more effective than curing them after the fact.  
Congress believed that once a corporation has become a monopolist it may 
be very difficult, if not impossible, to restructure the firm and restore 
competitive market conditions. 
The current rule of reason practically bars early interdiction against 
anticompetitive conduct and permits action against dominant firms only in 
a very limited set of circumstances.  Given the hazards of predicting the 
future, long-term anticompetitive effects are difficult, if not impossible, to 
prove in court.  In insisting on the showing of likely anticompetitive 
effects, the rule of reason undercuts the incipiency standard.156  These 
effects can be shown only after a corporation’s anticompetitive strategy has 
fulfilled its objective of enhanced market power or, at best, when the 
strategy is on the cusp of fulfilling its objective.  The rule of reason, by 
requiring the showing of anticompetitive effects, demands that plaintiffs 
wait and grant anticompetitive conduct the opportunity to blossom and 
even flourish. 
Some antitrust decisions have gone even further in raising the bar for 
plaintiffs in rule of reason cases.  In the area of monopolization, for 
example, some courts have adopted a restrictive effects-based approach 
 154.  See Stucke, supra note 1, at 620 (suggesting that the rule of reason is not consistent 
with enforcement of antitrust policy’s traditional goals). 
 155.  Averitt, supra note 51, at 243 (discussing comments by members of Congress 
aspiring to stop monopolies in their infancies). 
 156.  See Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust Review of the AT&T/T-Mobile 
Transaction, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 47, 58 (2011) (explaining how the incipiency standard 
cannot be honored under an effects-based approach). 
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that requires plaintiffs to show that the excluded rival(s) had the capability 
of providing short-term price competition against the defendant.157  In 
practical terms, under this standard dominant firms can be held liable only 
for excluding rivals that have comparable cost structures—an unlikely 
possibility for most new entrants and small rivals.158  If excluded rivals are 
required to show that they are “worthy” of antitrust protection under this 
cost-based screen, monopolists are given “free reign to squash nascent, 
albeit unproven, competitors at will.”159
IV. HOW THE FTC CAN HONOR CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND 
RESTORE PROGRESSIVE-POPULIST ANTITRUST LAW
Given its effective lawmaking authority over Section 5, the FTC can 
still change course and embrace the vision Congress established for Section 
5.  A critical first step is for the Commission to repudiate the ahistorical, 
discredited efficiency paradigm.  Moreover, many scholars who believe in 
antitrust enforcement oppose the rule of reason as the primary legal 
standard.160  Chief Justice Roberts has also criticized the rule of reason for 
its complexity.161
In place of the crabbed efficiency vision of a once expansive body of 
law, the FTC should look to the goals expressed by the members of 
Congress and Senators that created it: the protection of consumers and 
producers from firms with market power, the preservation of open markets, 
and the dispersal of private economic and political power.  Even a century 
after the FTC’s founding, these goals (a “citizen interest” rather than a 
 157.  See Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 909 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the primary “anticompetitive danger” posed by “multi-product bundled 
discount[s]” and the requirements a plaintiff challenging the discount must meet); see also
Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better 
Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 59-60 (2004) (laying out deficiencies for the “equally 
efficient competitor” standard while suggesting it “could harm consumer welfare”). 
 158.  See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 253, 321 (2003) (discussing means of constraining rival efficiency without ever 
driving them out of the market). 
 159.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
 160.  E.g., Stucke, supra note 141; Cudahy & Devlin supra note 142. 
 161.  See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2245 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“[A]lthough the question posed by this case is fundamentally a question of patent law—i.e., 
whether Solvay’s patent was valid and therefore permitted Solvay to pay competitors to 
honor the scope of its patent—the majority declares that such questions should henceforth 
be scrutinized by antitrust law’s unruly rule of reason. Good luck to the district courts that 
must, when faced with a patent settlement, weigh the ‘likely anticompetitive effects, 
redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in 
the circumstances.’”). 
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“consumer welfare” standard)162 are as relevant as ever, and arguably even 
more so today.163  The proposed interpretation would follow a venerable 
canon of statutory interpretation, looking to the legislative history of a law 
to articulate the meaning of general statutory text,164 and would be much 
more defensible than consulting the dated economic musings of legal 
scholars for guidance. 
To advance the citizen interest standard, the FTC should interpret 
Section 5 to cover a range of high risk conduct, some of which is treated 
very leniently at present.  Specifically, the FTC should establish 
presumptions of illegality for mergers in concentrated markets, certain 
types of conduct by firms with market power, and vertical restraints that 
limit retail competition and challenge durable or otherwise harmful 
possession of market power.  Simpler and stronger doctrine must be 
accompanied by simpler and stronger remedies for Section 5 violations.  In 
remedying anticompetitive behavior, the FTC should generally favor one-
time structural remedies over complicated behavioral fixes. 
A. The FTC Should Anchor Section 5 in the Congressionally 
Expressed Goals of the Statute 
Before specific legal rules can be formulated, the FTC must revisit the 
goals of antitrust law in general and Section 5 in particular.  In helping 
overthrow the historical understanding of antitrust, Robert Bork himself 
recognized that the identification of the goals of the legal regime is the 
essential first step.  He wrote that one must first ask, “What is the point of 
the law—what are its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we 
give.”165  Bork looked to the legislative histories of the antitrust statutes and 
incorrectly claimed that they establish allocative efficiency as the only goal 
of antitrust enforcement.166
 162.  Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 9, at 276. 
 163.  See Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political Law: A 
Taxonomy of Power, 9 DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 41 (2014) (describing how large 
corporations have “(1) the power to set policy, (2) the power to regulate, and (3) the power 
to tax”). 
 164.  E.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35, 40 (1990) (applying 
“traditional tools of statutory construction” including review of legislative history).  One 
common application of Chevron looks beyond statutory text and examines legislative 
history to determine whether a statute is ambiguous.  Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed 
Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be 
Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 818 (2010).  Under this less deferential formulation of 
Chevron, the proposed interpretation of Section 5 would still rest on a solid legal basis, 
whereas the efficiency interpretation would not. See supra Part II.A. 
 165.  ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50 (1978). 
 166.  Id. at 9. 
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The efficiency or consumer welfare goals that have dominated 
antitrust for the past two generations neither reflect the objectives of 
Congress nor address the structural problems in today’s economy.  
Congress, in creating the FTC, had a number of aims.  To be sure, the 
protection of consumers was an aim, but it was only one of several aims.  
The Congress that enacted the FTC Act sought to protect consumers, 
producers, competitors, and political institutions from concentrated private 
power.167  These goals are not just a historical artifact.  The growing public 
concerns about monopoly and oligopoly in the American economy extend 
beyond higher consumer prices.168  They also include diminished 
opportunities for entrepreneurs due to closed markets and the subversion of 
democracy by businesses with market power.  In short, the fears being 
expressed today—increasing concentration,169 fewer new businesses,170
increasing wealth inequality,171 and more profits concentrated in fewer 
firms172—bear a striking resemblance to those that Congress voiced more 
than a century ago. 
The FTC must renounce the narrow efficiency paradigm and 
reembrace the broad vision of Congress.  The efficiency paradigm is an 
ahistorical innovation developed in the 1960s and 1970s.  It reflects the 
empirically-deficient ideologies of some economists and lawyers, not the 
goals of Congress in 1914 or 1890, not the goals when the Clayton Act was 
amended after World War II, and not even the implicit goals of Congress 
when the FTC Act was amended in the 1980s.173  Perpetuating an ill-
 167.  See supra part II.A. 
 168.  See, e.g., Warren, supra note 3, at 2-4 (blaming market concentration for the lack 
of consumer choice, barriers to competition, the dearth of small businesses, “concentrated 
political power,” and the decline of the middle class). 
 169.  See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS
OF MARKET POWER 4 (2016) (noting that increased industry concentration is an indication of 
lower competition). 
 170.  See Ian Hathaway & Robert E. Litan, What’s Driving the Decline in the Firm 
Formation Rate? A Partial Explanation, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (2014), 
http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/driving_decline_firm_formation_ 
rate_hathaway_litan.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BFX-V6WN]. 
 171.  See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013). 
 172.  See supra at note 6. 
 173.  See May, supra note 73, at 286-300 (citing traditional economic theory as the 
driving force behind antitrust laws, rather than firm efficiency).  Eleanor M. Fox, The
Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1150 (1981) 
(“The legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment speaks clearly and 
overwhelmingly of the social evils of ‘concentration.’ The legislators who supported the 
Amendment did so on grounds of the dangers of increasing economic concentration, not on 
grounds of the virtues of efficiency.”); Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 263 (explaining that 
Congress amended the FTC’s consumer protection authority to comply with the logic of 
neoclassical economics but did not cabin its competition authority in the same manner). 
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defined efficiency goal with the rule of reason subverts the intentions of 
Congress.  By embracing efficiency, the FTC has allowed what Congress 
feared to come to fruition: oligopolistic and monopolistic markets that 
harm consumers, restrict entry, and undermine democratic institutions.  The 
FTC must anchor its advocacy, enforcement, and rulemaking in the ever-
relevant aims of Congress: 1) the protection of consumers and sellers (such 
as farmers) from wealth transfers due to firm market power, 2) the 
preservation of open markets, and 3) the dispersal of private economic and 
political power. 
B. The FTC Should Establish Presumptions Against Competitively 
Suspect Conduct 
To advance Congress’s goals in enacting Section 5, the FTC should 
establish presumptions of illegality for competitively suspicious conduct.  
Continued reliance on the rule of reason means continued antitrust 
dormancy.  Just consider the death of Section 2 (anti-monopoly) 
enforcement by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).174  While this decline in 
the number of DOJ Section 2 cases has multiple causes, the pro-defendant 
legal standards are likely a major factor.175  If the FTC is to effectuate 
Congressional intent, it must reject the rule of reason and adopt a series of 
presumptions of illegality for conduct that can injure consumers and 
producers, exclude rivals, and concentrate private power.  The FTC already 
applies presumptions of illegality to conduct resembling collusion.176  It, 
however, should go further and apply presumptions to a much broader set 
of competitively suspect behavior. 
 174.  Compare ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2006–2015 5, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download [https://perma.cc/FGJ7-9H4Q] (showing 
that only one monopoly case was filed in court between 2006 and 2015), with ANTITRUST
DIVISION, WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1970–1979 4, https://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2009/06/09/215792.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6VU-AVTR] 
(indicating that fifteen monopoly and oligopoly cases were filed in 1971 alone). 
 175.  Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
90 B.U. L. REV. 1611, 1613 (2010).  While plaintiffs face unfavorable legal standards in 
monopolization cases, some have still won important victories in this trying legal 
environment. See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 303 (3rd Cir. 2012) 
(affirming jury verdict finding defendant liable for anticompetitive exclusive dealing); Spirit 
Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 953 (6th Cir. 2005) (vacating district 
court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant accused of predatory pricing). 
 176.  See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(affirming FTC’s decision that agreements between competitors to restrict price cutting and 
advertising is inherently suspect); N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 362-
63 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “quick-look analysis” was appropriate for evaluating 
price fixing-like conduct). 
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The FTC has flexibility over how to develop these legal standards.177
It can create them through case-by-case adjudication, which has been the 
agency’s primary policymaking vehicle over the past few decades.178  It can 
also establish Section 5 antitrust legal standards through rulemakings.179
Also, the choice of whether to proceed through adjudication or rulemaking 
does not affect the level of deference that courts would accord to an FTC 
interpretation of Section 5.  Interpretations made through either 
adjudication or rulemaking are generally entitled to Chevron deference.180
On the competition side, the FTC’s rulemaking authority has not been 
changed in the multiple post-1970s Congressional amendments to the FTC 
Act.181  The FTC can issue competition rules under the standard notice-and-
comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act.  An FTC 
competition rule would not have to comply with the more onerous 
Magnuson-Moss Act procedures required for consumer protection rules.182
As to specific practices, the FTC should hold mergers in concentrated 
markets, conduct with exclusionary potential by dominant and near-
dominant firms, and vertical restraints on retail and other distributional 
competition to be presumptively illegal.  These types of conduct can harm 
consumers and producers, unfairly exclude rivals and new entrants, and 
concentrate private power.  To prevent these harms instead of correct them 
after the fact, the FTC should establish presumptions of illegality for a 
range of competitively problematic conduct. 
By replacing the costly and time-consuming rule of reason and other 
open-ended standards,183 these presumptions of illegality would discourage 
anticompetitive conduct and establish quasi-bright lines as to permissible 
 177.  NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974). 
 178.  Hayley Tsukayama, FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez Chats About Privacy, 
Security and Why She’s At CES, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/01/06/ftc-chairwoman-edith-
ramirez-chats-about-privacy-security-and-why-shes-at-ces/?utm_term=.df0f4f06b860 
[https://perma.cc/6LKD-GA7U] (describing FTC as “mainly a law enforcement agency”). 
 179.  The D.C. Circuit has held that the FTC has rulemaking authority under Section 5. 
Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 180.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001) (“We have 
recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express 
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that 
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”). 
 181.  See Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 233-37 (tracing the FTC’s Section 5 rulemaking 
power from National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n through the 1994 FTC Reauthorization). 
 182.  While Congress has modified the FTC’s rulemaking power under its consumer 
protection authority since 1973, it has not modified this power for the Commission’s 
antitrust authority. See Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 251 (“Congress has expressly 
acknowledged, discussed, and declined to alter this power in the context of Section 5’s 
prohibition against unfair methods of competition.”). 
 183.  Stucke, supra note 141, at 1461-63. 
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and impermissible conduct.184  At the same time, these presumptions would 
not amount to categorical prohibitions of the enumerated practices.  Rather, 
they would shift the burden of proof to firms that engage in competitively 
suspicious behavior and invite them to rebut the presumption of illegality 
through the showing of credible business justifications. 
1. Mergers 
Mergers in concentrated markets have serious anticompetitive 
potential.  These corporate consolidations can raise consumer prices by 
eliminating head-to-head competition and facilitating both express and 
implicit collusion.185  Mergers can also enhance the consolidating entities’ 
power to exclude rivals.186  While vertical mergers are assumed to be less 
harmful than horizontal mergers, they can also have serious anticompetitive 
effects.  For example, in markets with strong network effects, a dominant 
firm in one market can acquire a firm in an adjacent market, foreclose 
rivals from this market, and dictate the long-term development of the entire 
sector.187  Furthermore, the concentration of private power should not be 
ignored.  Mergers of all kinds—horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate—
concentrate the control of economic and political power in fewer hands. 
To prevent the harms from horizontal mergers, the FTC should use its 
Section 5 authority to adopt a strong presumption of illegality for mergers 
in concentrated markets.  The FTC should look to Supreme Court 
precedent for guidance here.  The Supreme Court has held that a horizontal 
merger that would result in the merged entity having a share of greater than 
thirty percent is presumptively illegal.188  The Court intimated that a merger 
involving parties with a combined market share of twenty percent may also 
be presumptively illegal.189 Philadelphia National Bank arose in the 
 184.  See generally Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with 
Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per Se Rules vs Rule of Reason”, 2 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 215 (2006) (favoring rule differentiation over case-by-case 
adjudication).  Proceedings under the proposed presumptions would not necessarily be as 
expeditious and straightforward as those under per se rules because, in some cases, market 
definitions and efficiencies would call for fact-intensive inquiries.  Stucke, supra note 141, 
at 1461-62. 
 185.  HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at §§ 6-7. 
 186.  HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at § 1. 
 187.  See, e.g., Marc Jarsulic et al., Reviving Antitrust: Why Our Economy Needs a 
Progressive Competition Policy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 16 (June 2016), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28143212/ 
RevivingAntitrust.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVY7-88QP] (suggesting that studies showed 
increased opportunities for anticompetitive effects following vertical integration). 
 188.  United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963). 
 189.  Id.
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context of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, not Section 5.190  The FTC should 
recognize the broader substantive reach of the Section 5 and adopt a 
presumption of illegality at no higher than the twenty percent threshold.191
In the area of vertical mergers, the FTC should also establish a 
comparable presumption of illegality.  The Supreme Court has not 
established bright lines concerning vertical mergers, as it has with 
horizontal mergers.192  Although the FTC does not have comparable 
precedential guidance in this area, it can use its investigatory and research 
powers to understand the dynamics of vertical mergers and determine the 
point at which vertical mergers threaten to raise prices and exclude rivals.  
At a minimum, the FTC should deem vertical acquisitions by dominant or 
near-dominant firms to be presumptively illegal, regardless of the size of 
the acquired firm.  In addition, a merger between a firm with a thirty 
percent or greater market share in one market and another firm with a thirty 
percent or greater share in an adjacent market could be subject to a 
presumption of illegality.193
Under the proposed presumptions, parties would have the opportunity 
to rebut a prima facie case of illegality through the showing of business 
justifications.  Parties to these combinations could rebut the presumption by 
showing that the merger is the least restrictive means to achieve a particular 
legitimate business goal.  For example, they could demonstrate that the 
merger is necessary to develop new product lines.  The presumption would 
be strong and difficult to rebut.  If the acquirer could reasonably achieve its 
purported objectives through means less threatening to competition, such as 
internal expansion, the presumption of illegality would not be overcome.  
Conversely, if the acquirer can establish that the merger is the least 
restrictive way to realize the objectives, it could rebut the presumption of 
illegality.
 190.  Id. at 335. 
 191.  See Stucke, supra note 150, at 555-56 (observing collusion in many moderately 
concentrated and unconcentrated markets). 
 192.  See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328 (1962) (“Since the 
diminution of the vigor of competition which may stem from a vertical arrangement results 
primarily from a foreclosure of a share of the market otherwise open to competitors, an 
important consideration in determining whether the effect of a vertical arrangement ‘may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly’ is the size of the share 
of the market foreclosed. However, this factor will seldom be determinative.”). 
 193.  See, e.g., Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C 
265) 6, 9 (“The Commission is unlikely to find concern in non-horizontal mergers, be it of a 
coordinated or of a non-coordinated nature, where the market share post-merger of the new 
entity in each of the markets concerned is below 30% and the post-merger HHI is below 
2000.”).
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2. Dominant Firm Conduct 
Dominant and would-be dominant firms can resort to a variety of 
practices to exclude competitors while maintaining or enhancing their 
market power.  Monopolists and near-monopolists can use exclusive 
dealing and market share penalties or rebates to prevent rivals from 
accessing consumers or essential distribution channels.194  They can also 
resort to predatory pricing whereby they use short periods of below-cost 
pricing to exclude competitors and deter possible entrants from 
participating in the market.195  In addition, they can engage in tying—
conditioning the purchase of a product in which they have monopoly power 
on the purchase of a related product in a competitive market as a means of 
extending their market power into this second market.196  While 
exclusionary tactics cannot be cataloged exhaustively, these are some of the 
anticompetitive practices that have been used over time in a variety of 
industries.
For dominant and near-dominant firms, the FTC should establish 
presumptions of illegality for particular types of conduct with exclusionary 
potential.  To further the incipiency standard of Section 5, these special 
presumptions should apply to both firms on the threshold of dominance, 
and firms with established market dominance.  A market share greater than 
or equal to forty percent would seem to be a reasonable cutoff.  For firms in 
this category, the FTC should adopt presumptions of illegality for, among 
other practices, exclusive dealing, market-share discounts, and predatory 
pricing.  Dominant and near-dominant firms that engaged in these practices 
would be presumptively in violation of Section 5.  The FTC would be 
following the logic of the existing Sherman Act approach to tying.197
 194.  See Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical Conduct: Where 
Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 141, 
150 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (suggesting that competition for exclusives creates 
competitive constraints on market participants and can lead to the exclusion of rivals). 
 195.  See Sandeep Vaheesan, Reconsidering Brooke Group: Predatory Pricing in Light 
of the Empirical Learning, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 81, 84-94 (2015) (discussing suspected 
and confirmed predatory pricing practices by dominant firms in the twentieth century). 
 196.  Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly 
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 417-20 (2009). 
 197.  See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-18 (1984) 
(stating that the validity of a tying arrangement should be determined by assessing whether 
consumers are forced to accept the tying arrangement through the sellers’ market power); 
see also Collins Inkjet Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 781 F.3d 264, 271-72 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(citations omitted) (“The tie falls foul of antitrust law if the seller has appreciable economic 
power in the tying product market and the arrangement affects a substantial volume of 
commerce in the tied market. . . . A tying arrangement that falls foul of these criteria and 
lacks a valid business justification is anticompetitive because it tends to force more efficient 
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A presumption of illegality based on a market share would recognize 
that the competitive implications of a particular form of conduct depend on 
the power of the entity practicing it.  For example, below-cost pricing by a 
firm with a fifty percent share of the market has radically different 
competitive implications than below-cost pricing by a recent entrant with 
just five percent of the market.198  The former has serious exclusionary 
potential, while the latter is much more likely to be competitively benign.199
Similar logic distinguishes exclusive dealing practiced by a 
monopolist or other dominant firm from exclusive dealing practice by a 
firm with a small market share.  The FTC has already recognized the 
competitive threat of monopolists’ use of exclusive arrangements with 
distributors.  Between 2008 and 2016, the FTC brought many enforcement 
actions against monopolists that insisted on exclusivity arrangements with 
distributors.200  The Commission recognized that under these 
circumstances, exclusive dealing threatened to exclude competitors and 
injure consumers in the short and long run.201  Given this enforcement 
record and collective body of evidence, exclusive dealing by dominant 
firms appears to be an obvious target for further policy development by the 
FTC.  A future FTC should establish, through either an enforcement action 
or rulemaking, that exclusive dealing by dominant and near-dominant firms 
is presumptively illegal under Section 5. 
Under these presumptions of illegality, firms would have the 
opportunity to present business justifications to rebut the FTC’s prima facie 
case of anticompetitive conduct.  They could overcome the presumption by 
showing that the practice is necessary to achieve a legitimate business aim 
competitors out of the tied product market.”). 
 198.  See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust 
laws—or that might even be viewed as procompetitive—can take on exclusionary 
connotations when practiced by a monopolist.”). 
 199.  Vaheesan, supra note 195, at 99-100. 
 200.  E.g., McWane, Inc. v FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 842 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming FTC 
decision that producer of domestic pipe fittings used exclusive dealing to improperly 
exclude competing domestic manufacturers of ductile iron pipe fittings); In re IDEXX 
Labs., Inc., 155 F.T.C. 241, 242 (2013) (alleging that the respondent used exclusive dealing 
to foreclose market access to rival manufacturers of veterinary diagnostic products); In re 
Pool Corp., F.T.C. No. 101-0115, 2012 WL 159752, at *6-7 (Jan. 10, 2012) (settling 
allegations the respondent used exclusive dealing to marginalize rival pool product 
distributors); In re Transitions Optical, Inc., 149 F.T.C. 1281, 1325 (2010) (settling 
allegations that respondent’s exclusive dealing with lens casters foreclosed rival 
photochromic lens makers from market). 
 201.  See, e.g., In re Transitions Optical, Inc., 149 F.T.C. at 1317 (foreclosure of “rivals 
from key distribution channels” reduced competition and led to “higher prices, lower output, 
reduced innovation and diminished consumer choice”). 
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and that the practice is the least restrictive means of doing so.  For 
example, a firm with a market share in excess of forty percent that engaged 
in a period of below-cost pricing could rebut the presumption of illegality 
by showing that this pricing practice was necessary and the least restrictive 
means of implementing a learning-by-doing strategy to lower long-term 
costs of production.202  The presumption would be strong and could only be 
overcome through the presentation of specific, credible evidence, not just 
assertions about theoretical efficiencies. 
3. Vertical Restraints 
Distributional restraints have immediate and long-term 
anticompetitive effects, lack empirically validated business justifications, 
and so should be subject to a presumption of illegality under Section 5.  
Practices such as resale price maintenance and exclusive territories limit 
intrabrand competition, raise consumer prices, and impede entry in the 
retail sector.  The justifications for these restraints are largely theoretical 
and not applicable to the vast majority of consumer products. 
Resale price maintenance (“RPM”), by design, restricts competition at 
the retail level, raises consumer prices, and impedes the emergence of new 
retailers and retail formats.  It sets a floor on retail prices and prevents 
retailers from competing freely on price.203  The harms extend beyond 
higher retail prices in the short run.  With diminished price competition at 
the retail level, retailers are likely to put less pressure on upstream 
distributors and manufacturers to cut wholesale prices.204  Resale price 
maintenance regimes also inhibit the growth of new innovative retail 
models because sellers with a lower cost structure cannot compete freely on 
price and share their cost advantages with consumers.205
The procompetitive justifications offered for resale price maintenance 
are theoretical and have limited applicability to real-world retail markets.  
The principal rationale is the need to protect full-service retailers offering 
costly point-of-sale support from the “free-riding” of lower-cost, no-service 
 202.  See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: 
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2280-81 (1999) (outlining several 
viable proof of efficiencies defenses that could rebut the presumption of illegality). 
 203.  Marina Lao, Free Riding: An Overstated, and Unconvincing, Explanation for 
Resale Price Maintenance, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 196, 210-
11 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
 204.  Robert L. Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When 
Are Vertical Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 407, 441-42 (1997). 
 205.  Marina Lao, Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free Rider 
Issues, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 473, 509 (2010). 
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retailers that compete through aggressive discounting.206  At oral arguments 
in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., Justice Breyer 
noted that this theoretical justification is decades-old and yet continues to 
have very limited empirical support.207  Notwithstanding this dearth of 
evidentiary support for the free riding theory, the Supreme Court, in its 
decisions liberalizing the law on vertical restraints, has stressed the need to 
protect against free riding at the retail level.208
While intangible promotional services can be important, they are not 
relevant for most consumer goods and can be provided through effective—
and less restrictive—alternatives for goods that require special sales 
support.  As a practical matter, few goods require retail services.209  The 
growth of online commerce has increased the availability of product 
information and diminished the need for retail sales support.210  Antitrust 
policy should not be made on a theory that is applicable to a very small 
subset of manufacturers and products.  And for goods that require sales 
support, superior alternatives exist.  At the retail level, one option is 
promotional allowances to retailers that agree to offer a discrete bundle of 
services.  For instance, a manufacturer of a complex product can pay 
retailers a fee on the condition that they provide product demonstrations.211
A manufacturer can also restrict the distribution of its products to, for 
example, full-service retailers that provide extensive sales support.212
Given the guaranteed loss of retail competition from vertical restraints 
and improbability of offsetting consumer benefits,213 the FTC should hold 
resale price maintenance and similar practices such as exclusive 
territories214 to be presumptively illegal under Section 5.  This standard 
 206.  John B. Kirkwood, Rethinking Antitrust Policy Toward RPM, 55 ANTITRUST BULL.
423, 443-48 (2010). 
 207.  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 877 (2007); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480). 
 208.  Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891-92; Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 
725 (1988). 
 209.  Lao, supra note 203, at 201. 
 210.  Marina Lao, Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free Rider 
Issues, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 473, 482 (2010). 
 211.  Warren S. Grimes, The Path Forward After Leegin: Seeking Consensus Reform of 
the Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467, 478 (2008). 
 212.  Kirkwood, supra note 206, at 447. 
 213.  See, e.g., Alexander MacKay & David Aron Smith, The Empirical Effects of 
Minimum Resale Price Maintenance 3 (Univ. of Chi. Kilts Ctr. for Mktg., Paper No. 2-006, 
2014) (finding that resale price maintenance is, on the whole, anticompetitive, resulting in 
higher prices and lower output). 
 214.  William S. Comanor, Vertical Arrangements and Antitrust Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1153, 1160 (1987). 
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would reflect the high risks of harm from these practices.  At the same 
time, businesses should be allowed to rebut the presumption by offering 
pro-consumer justifications.  Specifically, they should be entitled to 
overcome the presumption by showing that the restraint is reasonably 
necessary and the least restrictive alternative to achieve a beneficial end, 
such as the provision of point-of-sale services.  For instance, book 
publishers may be justified in instituting resale price maintenance.  Brick-
and-mortar sellers provide readers a distinctive opportunity to browse a 
wide selection of titles and subjects and receive recommendations from 
store staff, which may be services on which online sellers such as Amazon 
can free ride.215
C. The FTC Should Challenge Durable or Otherwise Seriously 
Harmful Monopolies and Oligopolies 
In addition to policing against the emergence of monopolistic and 
oligopolistic market structures, the FTC should challenge possession of 
durable or otherwise harmful monopoly and oligopoly power.  Given the 
existing levels of concentration in the economy,216 a purely preventative 
approach is not likely to be sufficient to tackle the problems of monopoly 
and oligopoly.  Durable market power can inflict substantial harm on the 
public—most obviously through prolonged pricing above competitive 
levels or depressed wages for workers and prices for producers.  Monopoly 
and oligopoly power in the market for necessities, even when it is not 
enduring, can similarly result in significant harm.  In addition, a monopoly 
represents a dramatic example of the concentration of private power and 
resources in which a single entity controls an entire market not just today, 
but perhaps for an extended period of time.  In interpreting Section 5 to 
apply to these instances of harmful market power, the FTC would depart 
from existing monopolization doctrine in an important way—it would not 
require the showing of bad acts on the part of the firm or firms with market 
power.
Under present Sherman Act precedent, monopoly power alone is not 
 215.  See Julie Bosman, Book Shopping in Stores, Then Buying Online, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
4, 2011), https://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/book-shopping-in-stores-
then-buying-online/?ref=todayspaper&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5AFJ-252M] (“Thirty-nine 
percent of people who bought books from Amazon in the same period said they had looked 
at the book in a bookstore before buying it from Amazon, the survey said.  As frustrated 
bookstore owners see it, the practice allows customers to take advantage of the stores’ 
careful selection of books, staff recommendations and warm atmosphere — all while 
spending their money elsewhere.”). 
 216.  ECONOMIST, supra note 6. 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 88 S
ide A
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 88 Side A      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
4_VAHEESAN_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:34 PM
2017] THE LATENT POWER OF THE FTC 685 
illegal even though it can inflict substantial harm on the public.  To invite 
legal liability, monopoly power must be accompanied by bad acts, such as 
predatory pricing.217  This principle is a long-standing norm in antitrust 
case law, preceding the Chicago School reinterpretation.218  Yet, the harm 
from market power is no less real even in the absence of bad conduct.  For 
example, enduring market power can amount to the public paying a private 
tax for a product for an extended period of time.219  In the market for 
necessities, such as electricity,220 even short periods of market power can 
result in massive wealth transfers from consumers to businesses.  The 
exercise of market power in a number of pharmaceutical markets is the 
latest illustration of the real harm inflicted on consumers.221
The doctrinal requirement of bad conduct can be a costly and 
unnecessary diversion.  In monopolization cases, the aim of the litigation 
may be to restructure a noncompetitive market—not merely prohibit 
particular bad acts.222  By requiring evidence of anticompetitive behavior, 
Section 2 precedent has required the devotion of substantial resources to a 
secondary issue and led to interminable and costly litigation, resembling 
“an epic Russian film with a bewildering cast of hundreds, byzantine 
procedural complexity, and elaborate records.”223  The landmark 
monopolization suits against AT&T and IBM embody the problems 
associated with a conduct-focused approach.  Litigants spent huge sums of 
money and years trying to resolve whether the defendants had undertaken 
improper acts, when the purpose of the cases was to remedy the persistent 
monopolistic structure of the telecommunications and computer markets.224
The FTC should challenge persistent or otherwise harmful market 
 217.  Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004). 
 218.  United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
 219.  Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr. et al., Elimination of the Conduct Requirement in 
Government Monopolization Cases, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 83, 87 (1980). 
 220.  Frank A. Wolak, Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity 
Markets: The California Market, 1998-2000, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 425, 430 (2003). 
 221.  See, e.g., Carolyn Y. Johnson & Catherine Ho, How Mylan, the Maker of EpiPen, 
Became a Virtual Monopoly, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/2016/08/25/7f83728a-6aee-11e6-ba32-
5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html [https://perma.cc/RPJ7-MXDP] (discussing the harm of current 
monopolies to the pharmaceutical industry). 
 222.  See Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 497, 546 (noting the historical preference in the United States for “maintaining 
competitive market structures, rather than regulatory dictates”). 
 223.  John J. Flynn, Do the Proposals Make Any Sense from a Business Standpoint? Pro 
No-Conduct Monopoly: An Assessment for the Lawyer and Businessman, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 
1255, 1264 (1980). 
 224.  Id. at 1265. 
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power under its Section 5 authority even in the absence of bad conduct.  
Section 5 should be interpreted to reach these structural problems directly 
when a persistent lack of competition or substantial public harm can be 
shown.  That said, no-fault market power is a departure from existing 
antitrust doctrine and should be applied judiciously.225  The required factual 
showing should be significant and should only be satisfied in exceptional 
cases in which the harm to the public is enduring or otherwise severe. 
The FTC should establish two legal standards for no-fault market 
power.  First, the FTC should show durable monopoly power that has not 
been diminished through new entry, technological change, or reduced 
demand for the product.  Second, and alternatively, the FTC should show 
market power that inflicts substantial monetary harm on the public because 
it affects the markets for necessities in which demand is highly inelastic.  
Examples include the market power that has been witnessed in some 
electricity226 and pharmaceutical markets.227  Furthermore, satisfying this 
requirement of persistent or substantially harmful market power should 
establish only a presumption of illegality.  Parties should have the 
opportunity to rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the monopoly 
power is, for instance, the product of operational efficiencies that would be 
lost under a more competitive market structure or was the necessary spur to 
innovate, as in certain pharmaceutical markets.228
 225.  The European Commission’s careful targeting of exploitative pricing under the 
abuse of dominance standard can inform FTC action against durable monopolies. Working
Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation, at 10, WD (2011) 54 (Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2011_oct_excessive_prices.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/87X5-GN96] (“The case law . . . shows that the Commission and 
European Courts addressed the question of excessive prices only in markets with an 
entrenched dominant position where entry and expansion of competitors could not be 
expected to ensure effective competition in the foreseeable future.”). 
 226.  Wolak, supra note 220, at 430. See also Severin Borenstein, James B. Bushnell & 
Frank A. Wolak, Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California’s Restructured Wholesale 
Electricity Market, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1376, 1398 (2002) (finding that between the 
summers of 1998 and 2000, oligopoly rents “increased by an order of magnitude, from 
about $425 million to $4.44 billion”). 
 227. Johnson & Ho, supra note 221.  The United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets 
Authority has brought multiple no-fault monopoly actions against pharmaceutical 
companies. E.g., Press Release, Competition & Mkts. Auth., Pharm. Co. Accused of 
Overcharging NHS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pharmaceutical-
company-accused-of-overcharging-nhs [https://perma.cc/4UAL-7BCW]; Press Release, 
Competition & Mkts. Auth., CMA Fines Pfizer and Flynn £90 Million for Drug Price Hike 
to NHS (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-fines-pfizer-and-flynn-
90-million-for-drug-price-hike-to-nhs [https://perma.cc/FMT4-HR9Y]. 
 228.  Dougherty, Jr. et al., supra note 219, at 90-91. 
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D. The FTC Should Favor Simple Structural Remedies 
Along with establishing presumptions of illegality for competitively 
suspicious conduct and bringing persistent or otherwise harmful market 
power, the FTC must adopt effective remedies when it establishes a 
violation of Section 5.  Even clear legal prohibitions on anticompetitive 
behavior cannot be effective if they are accompanied by weak, inadequate 
remedies.229  Under these circumstances, a company may be allowed to 
continue its anticompetitive conduct or a market may remain structurally 
noncompetitive. 
To ensure the effectiveness of Section 5, the FTC must commit to 
simple structural remedies.  In cases in which a specific anticompetitive 
practice is the principal barrier to a competitive market, a conduct 
remedy—a prohibition on this act—may be sufficient to restore 
competition.  In cases in which the structure of the market is at issue, only a 
structural remedy is likely to be sufficient.  A conduct remedy, in these 
matters, would typically involve a combination of prohibitions, 
requirements, and ongoing oversight by the FTC.  Conduct remedies are 
likely to be incomplete and susceptible to evasion in spirit, if not in letter.230
In contrast, a structural remedy allows for a one-time fix that, if properly 
implemented, addresses the problem and removes the need for intrusive 
regulatory oversight in the future.231
The FTC should establish a strong presumption in favor of structural 
solutions in merger and other matters implicating market structure.  In 
challenging anticompetitive mergers, the FTC should seek to stop mergers 
outright instead of modify them through divestitures.  Divestitures have 
often failed to preserve competition even from a consumer welfare 
perspective.232  Some recent FTC-mandated divestitures in mergers have 
failed in spectacular fashion.233  Furthermore, these divestitures do nothing 
 229.  See United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 323 (1961) 
(“The proper disposition of antitrust cases is obviously of great public importance, and their 
remedial phase, more often than not, is crucial. For the suit has been a futile exercise if the 
Government proves a violation but fails to secure a remedy adequate to redress it.”). 
 230.  Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147, 189-90 
(2005).
 231.  Neil W. Averitt, Structural Remedies in Competition Cases Under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 40 OH. ST. L.J. 781, 833 (1979). 
 232.  STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, A STUDY OF 
THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
attachments/merger-review/divestiture.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3BP-XSKA]. 
 233.  Brent Kendall & Peg Brickley, Albertsons to Buy Back 33 Stores It Sold as Part of 
Merger With Safeway, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2015, 7:26 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/albertsons-to-buy-back-33-stores-it-sold-as-part-of-merger-
with-safeway-1448411193 [https://perma.cc/A62Z-WB7Z]; Brent Kendall & Jacqueline 
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to stop the concentration of private economic and political power.  
Companies are permitted to grow in size through consolidation, so long as 
they sell assets in markets in which there is head-to-head competition.  In 
dominant firm cases that seek to address the underlying market structure, 
the FTC should pursue restructuring remedies that, for example, divide the 
company into multiple competing entities or separate related lines of 
business into separate firms. 
V. RESPONDING TO LIKELY OBJECTIONS TO AN EXPANSIVE 
SECTION 5
The proposed interpretation of Section 5 represents a break with 
decades of antitrust thinking and would trigger opposition if adopted.  It 
harkens back to an older tradition of antitrust that had a more 
comprehensive understanding of corporate power than today’s fixation on 
short-term price and output effects.  Dominant corporations certainly prefer 
the permissive antitrust environment at present and would resist any efforts 
to strength antitrust doctrine.  Industry-funded academics, consultants, and 
lobbyists who champion lax antitrust policy would likely be another 
important voice against change.234  And even those sympathetic to a more 
Palank, How the FTC’s Hertz Antitrust Fix Went Flat, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2013, 8:03 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579246281764302824 
[https://perma.cc/TGT2-URTR]. 
 234.  See, e.g., Eisinger & Elliott, supra note 153 (“Economists who specialize in 
antitrust — affiliated with Chicago, Harvard, Princeton, the University of California, 
Berkeley, and other prestigious universities — reshaped their field through scholarly work 
showing that mergers create efficiencies of scale that benefit consumers.  But they reap their 
most lucrative paydays by lending their academic authority to mergers their corporate 
clients propose.  Corporate lawyers hire them from Compass Lexecon and half a dozen 
other firms to sway the government by documenting that a merger won’t be ‘anti-
competitive’: in other words, that it won’t raise retail prices, stifle innovation, or restrict 
product offerings.  Their optimistic forecasts, though, often turn out to be wrong, and the 
mergers they champion may be hurting the economy.”); David Dayen, Google Gets a Seat 
on the Trump Transition Team, INTERCEPT (Nov. 15, 2016, 4:08 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2016/11/15/google-gets-a-seat-on-the-trump-transition-team/ 
[https://perma.cc/D7VX-GMF3] (“Joshua Wright has been put in charge of transition efforts 
at the influential Federal Trade Commission after pulling off the rare revolving-door 
quadruple-play, moving from Google-supported academic work to government – as an FTC 
commissioner – back to the Google gravy train and now back to the government.”). 
 Looking beyond particular individuals, the ascendancy of the Chicago School in 
antitrust can be attributed, in part, to self-interested funding from big business interests: 
Chicago’s intellectual ascendance also aligned fortuitously with the interests of 
the increasingly organized business community. Henry Manne, an Antitrust 
Workshop alum who was a critical entrepreneur in the law and economics 
movement, found that between 1968 and 1971 it became much easier to raise 
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expansive Section 5 may express reservations because of past 
Congressional backlash against a zealous FTC.  At least three arguments 
are likely to gain traction in public debates. 
The proposed interpretation would defuse one common criticism that 
has been leveled against Section 5 for many years.  Some commentators 
have claimed that Section 5, with its vagueness, creates great uncertainty 
for businesses.  Per this view, corporations and their counsel do not know 
in advance what type of conduct runs afoul of Section 5.235  By establishing 
a system of presumptions, the interpretation of Section 5 advanced here 
would greatly diminish legal uncertainty and simplify compliance.  The 
proposed interpretation of Section 5 would have greater clarity than the rule 
of reason under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.236  With a series of relative 
bright lines, businesses would have much greater legal guidance on 
permissible conduct than they do, at present, under the open-ended rule of 
reason and Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
industry money on its behalf: ‘At this point, the [corporate] world knew that 
Chicago economics was the only thing that could possibly save them from an 
antitrust debacle, and I related it strongly to that. . . . Well, of the eleven [major 
corporations] I wrote to, within a few weeks I had $10,000 from ten of them, 
and the last $10,000 came in a few weeks later.’ Similarly, funders of the Airlie 
House conference, at which Chicago supporters saw themselves as having 
trounced [the structure-conduct-performance school of antitrust thought], read 
basically like a list of 1960s Antitrust Division targets: Alcoa, Amoco, 
Bethlehem Steel, Exxon, General Electric, General Motors, IBM, and so on. 
Elizabeth Popp Berman, How Experts Can, and Can’t, Change Policy: Economics, 
Antitrust, and the Linked Evolution of the Academic and Policy Fields 24-25 (Jan. 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://osf.io/c4bfm/?action=download [https://perma.cc/PF5Y-
27P9] (footnotes omitted). 
 235.  E.g., James C. Cooper, The Perils of Excessive Discretion: The Elusive Meaning of 
Unfairness in Section 5 of the FTC Act 33, 52-53 (Geo. Mason Mercatus Ctr., Working 
Paper No. 13-20, 2013), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Perils-Excessive-Discretion-
Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZF4-Q7DX] (stating that the ambiguous antitrust provision 
of the FTC Act has left businesses unsure of “unfair methods of competition” in comparison 
to legal activities). 
 236.  See Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing A Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of 
Reason in U.S. Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 591, 623-24 (2012) (“The 
rule of reason is now 100 years old and the promise of clarification through judicial 
application has proven to be empty.  The rule’s purported standard is devoid of substantive 
content that could guide judges to apply it consistently so that patterns could emerge.  Not 
only has the Court failed to give content to this legal standard, but it has indulged in shifting 
the standard around in response to the economic theory du jour.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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A. Attacking the Proposed Interpretation of Section 5 on Efficiency 
Grounds Ignores Congressional Intent 
Critics of the proposed interpretation may claim that it would prevent 
businesses from engaging in efficiency-enhancing conduct.  Conduct that 
enhances efficiency, according to the precepts of neoclassical price theory, 
would be either prohibited or discouraged under an expansive Section 5, 
the critics would claim.  The result would be higher prices and reduced 
economic output.  According to this view, antitrust would once again be a 
policy “at war with itself.”237
This objection is wide of the mark and assumes that efficiency is the 
proper objective of Section 5 and antitrust law generally.  To paraphrase a 
line from an iconic dissent of Justice Holmes, the FTC Act does not enact 
Mr. Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox. 238  Rather, the Congress that enacted 
the FTC Act had a grand political economic vision that aimed to protect 
consumers and producers from the overwhelming power of large 
corporations, preserve businesses’ freedom to compete, and defend 
American political institutions from the power of large businesses.239  To 
criticize the proposed interpretation of Section 5 for reducing economic 
efficiency is to assume that an ill-defined efficiency goal is the appropriate 
goal of antitrust.  The legislative histories of the antitrust statutes, including 
the FTC Act, contradict this assumption in no uncertain terms.  As the 
Supreme Court has noted, “[c]itizens and legislators may rightly insist that 
they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order to 
deter what they consider morally offensive conduct” and that “efficiency is 
just one consideration among many.”240
Allocative efficiency is not somehow “neutral” or “apolitical.”  It 
seeks to promote a concept of social welfare that takes the existing 
distribution of resources as given, posits that human behavior is rational 
and selfish, and calls on the state to enforce property and contractual rights 
to a maximal degree.241  By omitting any consideration of distributional 
 237.  Bork, supra note 165. 
 238.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 239.  See supra part II.A. 
 240.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439-40 (2001) 
(quoting Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal 
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1450 (1993)). 
 241.  John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Policy, “Original Intent” 
and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 265-67 (1988).  
Even on neoclassical terms, the efficiency paradigm is deficient because it ignores 
externalities, a rather major omission at a time of global climate change.  Jeffrey L. 
Harrison, Some Inconvenient Truths About Antitrust Law and Economics 9 (Univ. Fla. 
Levin Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 17-1, 2017), 
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consequence, this conception of efficiency is heavily skewed in favor of the 
status quo.242  Exposing these assumptions reveals the conservative nature 
of allocative efficiency. 
The proposed presumptions would not dismiss the importance of 
efficiency in business operations.  Under the proposed Section 5, 
businesses that trigger a presumption of illegality, whether due to a 
proposed merger or competitively suspect conduct, would have the 
opportunity to establish business justifications.  For example, a horizontal 
merger that exceeds the threshold of twenty percent would be 
presumptively illegal.  The parties, however, could rebut this presumption 
by demonstrating that the merger is necessary and the least restrictive way 
to achieve an operational efficiency. This approach would be an inversion 
of the current standard in which efficiencies are assumed and 
anticompetitive harm has to be shown.243  Efficiencies would no longer be 
accepted as a matter of faith in neoclassical economic logic.244  They would 
have to be shown.  Given the congressional vision for the FTC Act, this is 
the appropriate standard. 
B. Claiming that Proposed Section 5 Would Create Substantive 
Inconsistency Between the FTC and the DOJ Disregards 
Congressional Intent and Existing Antitrust Practice 
Critics of the proposed Section 5 would likely also claim that it would 
drive a wedge between the statutory authorities of the FTC and those of the 
DOJ.  Proposed Section 5 would give the FTC more sweeping powers than 
the DOJ.  An investigation by the FTC could have a very different result 
than a comparable investigation by the DOJ.  In the context of mergers, this 
problem may be most acute because the two agencies have divided up the 
review process by industry.  A merger in the chemical industry 
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=3500170640030841130670980990871111190
97014088087016004031104071030089006066070008030032012051099111045001108075
00808511907502905807301705206502006801111802402406409008802903212306611611
8090028120117082072076093066073089123024021113079065119111085124070&EXT=
pdf [https://perma.cc/WB9V-M9V3]. 
 242.  Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 215 
(1985).
 243.  See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]o 
be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’  
That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers.  In contrast, 
harm to one or more competitors will not suffice.”). 
 244.  See Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK 77, 81-86 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (observing how conservative 
economic assumptions have driven Supreme Court’s antitrust rulings). 
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(traditionally reviewed by the FTC) would be subject to different legal 
standards than a merger in the airline industry (traditionally reviewed by 
the DOJ). 
The possibility of divergences would not undercut the case for a more 
expansive Section 5.  Some differences could be resolved.  For example, 
the DOJ could, through guidelines and litigation, seek to establish similar 
or identical merger standards to the FTC under the Clayton Act, which, like 
the FTC Act, is an incipiency statute. 
Even when differences would arise, they would reflect a conscious 
choice on the part of Congress.  When creating the FTC, Congress granted 
the FTC more expansive statutory authority than the DOJ.  The FTC was 
established against the backdrop of the Sherman Act being enforced by the 
DOJ and private parties.  The Sherman Act had been in existence for 
twenty-five years when the FTC came into being.  Congress intended for 
the FTC Act to reach a larger set of business conduct than the Sherman 
Act, which was viewed as not being up to the challenge of controlling the 
corporate giants of the day.245  For example, the incipiency standard of the 
FTC Act was meant to correct the overly permissive standard of the 
Sherman Act.246  The broader reach of Section 5 was a conscious choice by 
Congress.  Demanding that the DOJ and the FTC apply their powers in an 
identical fashion overlooks this Congressional decision. 
The divergence criticism ignores current antitrust practice and 
assumes an inter-agency harmony that does not exist at present.  At any 
given time, the DOJ and FTC have different leadership and can be expected 
to diverge at least on the margins.  For example, the FTC has brought many 
more Section 2 actions than the DOJ since 2009, suggesting that the former 
views monopolization as a higher priority than the latter.247  And during the 
George W. Bush administration, the two agencies clashed in public, most 
notably over the meaning of Section 2.248  These are just some of the 
 245.  See supra Part II.B. 
 246.  See supra Part II.B. 
 247.  The DOJ has brought two Section 2 cases during the Obama years: United States v. 
United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-07992 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 10, 2015); United States 
v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., No. 7:11-cv-00030 (N.D. Tex. filed Feb. 25, 2011).  The 
FTC has brought at least seven Section 2 cases: McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814 (11th 
Cir. 2015); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., No. 15-cv-3031 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 20, 2015); 
FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 428, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2015); In re IDEXX Labs., Inc., 
155 F.T.C. 241 (2013); In re Pool Corp., F.T.C. No. 101-0115, 2012 WL 159752 (Jan. 10, 
2012); In re Intel Corp., 150 F.T.C. 420 (2010); In re Transitions Optical, Inc., 149 F.T.C. 
1281 (2010). 
 248.  See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Commissioners React to Department 
of Justice Report, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act (Sept. 8, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/09/ftc-
commissioners-react-department-justice-report-competition-and [https://perma.cc/KPC3-
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differences between two agencies. 
The federal judiciary adds another thick layer of doctrinal 
inconsistency today.  In a legal system made up of hundreds of district and 
appellate judges at the federal system, legal harmony is a futile aspiration.  
The existing substantive law in antitrust, which elevates open-ended 
standards over rules, guarantees a legal patchwork.249  For instance, a 
merger challenge heard by a conservative judge is likely to fare differently 
than a merger challenge before a progressive judge.  At present, certain 
circuits are seen as more sympathetic to particular claims than others.250
The Supreme Court could, of course, establish legal standardization.  Yet, 
in light of the relatively few cases heard by the Supreme Court in a given 
year, harmonization of legal standards is improbable and, at best, likely to 
happen after an extended period of conflicting or inconsistent standards in 
the lower courts. 
C. Recognizing the Threat of Adverse Congressional Action Does Not 
Compel Continued Adherence to the Antitrust Status Quo 
Among those sympathetic to an expansive Section 5, some are likely 
to express reservations about its political feasibility.  History certainly 
lends support to this concern.  Congress has been hostile to an activist FTC 
in the past and could be expected to move to rein in any activism.  In the 
1970s, the FTC zealously pursued its antitrust and consumer protection 
missions.251  This period of aggressive enforcement and rulemaking 
triggered a powerful backlash from corporate America.252  The Washington 
Post condemned the Commission as the “National Nanny” in a stinging 
editorial.253  This period of zeal ended poorly for the FTC.  Congress 
74ZY] (stating that the Department of Justice Report on Section 2 “is chiefly concerned 
with firms that enjoy monopoly or near-monopoly power, and prescribes a legal regime that 
places these firms’ interests ahead of those of consumers”). 
 249.  Stucke, supra note 141, at 1432-33. 
 250.  As an example of the divergence, the Third and Ninth Circuits treat loyalty rebates 
by dominant firms differently.  Compare LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(adopting a more plaintiff-friendly standard) with Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 
F.3d 883, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying standard favoring defendants). 
 251.  William J. Baer, Where to From Here: Reflection on the Recent Saga of the 
Federal Trade Commission, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 51, 53 (1986). 
 252.  Michael Pertschuk, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Lecture at the University of 
California Berkeley School of Business Administration: Stoning the National Nanny: 
Congress and the FTC in the Late 70’s (Nov. 11, 1981), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/public_statements/688981/19811104_pertschuk_lecture_iii_stoning
_the_national_nanny-_congress_and_the_ftc_in_the_late_70s.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7UA-
LF88].
 253.  Editorial, The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 1978), 
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asserted new power over the agency and imposed additional procedural 
conditions on the use of its consumer protection authority.254
This fear of a political backlash from business and Congress may be 
the strongest line of criticism of an expansive Section 5.  Corporations pour 
money into Congressional campaigns to ensure that their interests are 
represented and advanced.  Although the FTC has been averse to policy 
activism or innovation for decades, the House has tried to limit the FTC’s 
authority to challenge mergers under Section 5, in the name of creating 
harmony between the FTC and the DOJ.255
The recent experience of another federal agency is instructive.  
Congressional Republicans, with the support of some Democrats, have 
been trying to hobble the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”).256  The CFPB is seen as aggressively pursuing its statutory 
mission, bringing a wide range of enforcement actions and writing a 
number of rules to regulate consumer finance markets.257  In light of its 
vigor, the opposition from Congress does not come as a surprise.  Even 
under more favorable political circumstances, an FTC that seeks to breathe 
life into Section 5 is certain to invite comparable Congressional opposition. 
The probable reaction from many ideologically or financially captured 
members of Congress should not be underestimated, let alone ignored.  
Corporate interests and their Congressional allies would seek to curtail any 
Section 5 expansions.  The FTC is a creation of Congress and so must 
answer to Congress.  Congress can undertake a range of actions to limit the 
FTC’s day-to-day ability to function and its statutory power.  At an 
extreme, Congress could repeal the FTC Act and shut down the FTC 
entirely.  The risks to the FTC’s future would include various existential 
threats and should not be brushed aside.  Undertaking a reinterpretation of 
Section 5 without an awareness of political dynamics on Capitol Hill would 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/03/01/the-ftc-as-national-
nanny/69f778f5-8407-4df0-b0e9-7f1f8e826b3b/ [https://perma.cc/632F-DTQL]. 
 254.  Baer, supra note 251, at 54. 
 255.  Press Release, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., Regulatory Reform 
Subcommittee to Hold Hearing on the SMARTER Act (June 12, 2015), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/press-release/regulatory-reform-subcommittee-to-hold-hearing-
on-the-smarter-act/ [https://perma.cc/Z95A-XRPG]. 
 256.  See, e.g., Victoria Finkle, House Republicans Clash With Consumer Protection 
Unit Chief, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/03/17/business/dealbook/house-republicans-clash-with-consumer-protection-unit-
chief.html [https://perma.cc/PK9K-E99P] (describing criticism levelled at the bureau by 
Congressional Republicans and some Democrats). 
 257.  See, e.g., David Dayen, CFPB Turns 5 – and Financial Scammers Aren’t 
Celebrating, FISCAL TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/ 
2016/07/22/CFPB-Turns-5-and-Financial-Scammers-Aren-t-Celebrating 
[https://perma.cc/9H6A-FXSZ]. 
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be a grave mistake. 
Yet, these political risks do not call for resignation and indefinite 
inaction.  Just as the power of corporate interests in American society 
cannot be dismissed, the changing political dynamics in the United States 
should also not be discounted.  Forty years of income stagnation and a 
dramatic rise in inequality have brought the merits of existing political 
economic arrangements, including weakened antitrust,258 into doubt.259  At 
a 2016 Senate antitrust oversight hearing, Democrats and Republicans 
raised concern over inadequate antitrust enforcement.260  Even Senator 
Mike Lee, a hardline conservative from Utah, questioned the effectiveness 
of current merger policy.261  Senator Bernie Sanders, a self-described 
democratic socialist, championed economic populism and a revival of the 
New Deal and won twenty-two states in his campaign to be the Democratic 
nominee for president—a campaign that seemed quixotic just a year ago.262
The Democratic Party now has a faction that seeks to challenge the status 
quo across a number of areas,263 including antitrust.264  Public concerns 
about the power of corporations are being reported in the mainstream press 
again, after years of neglect.265  Even President Trump has raised concerns 
about corporate mergers and monopolies,266 though it seems unlikely he 
will act in any systematic fashion.267
 258.  See supra notes 1 and 2. 
 259.  Jedediah Purdy, A World to Make: Eleven Theses for the Bernie Sanders 
Generation, DISSENT MAG. (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/ 
online_articles/eleven-theses-bernie-sanders-generation-democratic-socialism 
[https://perma.cc/WFN8-N8C3]. 
 260.  Cooper, supra note 2. 
 261.  Cooper, supra note 2. 
 262.  Kurtis Lee, Bernie Sanders Signals He’s Winding Down His Campaign, But 
Doesn’t Quit, L.A. TIMES (June 16, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-bernie-
sanders-campaign-20160616-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/KS5G-VM9N]. 
 263.  E.g., Adam Green, How the Elizabeth Warren Wing Shifted Tuesday’s Democratic 
Debate, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-green/how-the-elizabeth-
warren-_b_8270958.html [https://perma.cc/D6QD-6YXJ] (last updated Oct. 9, 2016) 
(stating that Democrats shifted the focus to economic populist issues during the 2016 
presidential debates). 
 264.  Warren, supra note 3. 
 265.  See supra notes 1 and 2. 
 266.  Michael J. de la Merced & Cecilia Kang, Future of Big Mergers Under Trump? 
Like Much Else, It’s Unclear, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 10, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/business/dealbook/future-of-big-mergers-under-trump-
like-much-else-its-unclear.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/FYR7-MERP]. 
 267.  See Brian Fung, Trump Names Maureen Ohlhausen as Acting FTC Chairwoman,
WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/ 
2017/01/25/trump-names-maureen-ohlhausen-as-acting-ftc-chairwoman/?utm_ 
term=.738c83e5845d [https://perma.cc/JRF7-BDSQ] (describing Ohlhausen’s skepticism 
toward FTC enforcement actions and FCC’s net neutrality rules). 
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The Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) rule to impose 
non-discrimination and no-blocking requirements on broadband providers 
(popularly known as “net neutrality”)268 offers lessons on how the FTC 
could proceed.  The FCC’s campaign to establish net neutrality challenged 
some of the most powerful corporations in the country and involved 
judicial setbacks and multiple policy reversals.269
The FCC succeeded in large measure because of the political support 
for net neutrality.  Activists and advocates effectively conveyed the 
importance of net neutrality to the broader population and tailored their 
message to different communities.270  Businesses that stood to lose from the 
exclusionary practices of broadband providers also played an important 
role in championing net neutrality.271  Furthermore, the FCC enjoyed key 
support in Washington, with President Obama272 and a number of 
Representatives and Senators273 calling for strong net neutrality rules.274
The groundswell of public support, reflected in the 4 million mostly 
supportive comments that were submitted to the FCC,275 and pressure from 
high-profile political figures persuaded the FCC to take a strong approach 
and surely steeled its political will. 
Political and public support for a broad Section 5 is essential.  If the 
FTC were to proceed without strong public support and backing from the 
White House and progressive factions in Congress, it would face long odds 
 268.  In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015). 
 269.  See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (vacating the FCC’s 
2010 net neutrality rules); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(vacating the FCC’s regulation of Comcast’s broadband network). 
 270.  What Worked in the Fight for Net Neutrality, GETTYSBURG PROJECT (Aug. 2015) 
http://gettysburgproject.org/net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/Q8XH-AF6X]. 
 271.  Id.
 272.  Inae Oh, Obama Just Announced His Full Support to Preserve Net Neutrality,
MOTHER JONES (Nov. 10, 2014, 12:05 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
mojo/2014/11/obama-net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/8LJY-6YN5]. 
 273.  E.g., Press Release, Office of Senator Ron Wyden, Senators Urge FCC to Promote 
Net Neutrality, Reverse Proposal to Create Internet Toll Lanes (May 9, 2014), 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-urge-fcc-to-promote-net-
neutrality-reverse-proposal-to-create-internet-toll-lanes [https://perma.cc/KW2M-PZRA]; 
Julian Hattem, Franken: Net Neutrality Is “First Amendment Issue of Our Time”, THE HILL
(July 8, 2014, 4:08 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/211607-franken-net-
neutrality-is-first-amendment-issue-of-our-time [https://perma.cc/JD3T-D8G8]. 
 274.  Edward Wyatt, Obama Asks F.C.C. to Adopt Tough Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/technology/obama-net-
neutrality-fcc.html [https://perma.cc/8ZJ4-JLWB]. 
 275.  Todd Shields, It Took Four Million E-Mails to Get the FCC to Set Net-Neutrality 
Rules, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2015, 1:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2015-02-03/a-rant-and-4-million-e-mails-later-fcc-to-set-web-traffic-rules 
[https://perma.cc/HTV4-4Q2V]. 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 94 S
ide A
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 94 Side A      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
4_VAHEESAN_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:34 PM
2017] THE LATENT POWER OF THE FTC 697 
of success.  One agency alone, regardless of its determination, cannot stand 
up to the power of big business. 
If, however, the FTC can draw on and reinforce public support and 
count on the White House and Congress to champion its efforts, it has a 
much better chance of overcoming powerful opposition.  Activists and 
advocates who support open, competitive markets would have to play a 
principal role in explaining the significance of Section 5 to the public.  As 
the net neutrality episode shows, skilled advocates can explain and 
demonstrate the significance of arcane issues such as telecommunications 
policy to a lay audience.  Antitrust law, which once inspired popular 
movements,276 can certainly be translated into accessible and compelling 
language.277  Moreover, businesses that are threatened by dominant 
incumbents would also have to be engaged and mobilized to challenge the 
power and narrative of the anti-Section 5 monopolists and oligopolists. 
While the near term is bleak on antitrust, among other areas, a future 
FTC may be in a position to restore the progressive-populist foundation of 
antitrust law.  Under the leadership of the conservative Maureen 
Ohlhausen, the FTC appears poised for at least a few more years of 
dormancy.278  But looking past the immediate future and to subsequent 
leadership, the FTC may have an opportunity to make antitrust a force 
against concentrated private power and for ordinary Americans. 
An antitrust revival through Section 5 would not be easy and would 
require determination and patience on the part of those inside and outside 
government who believe in a reinvigorated Section 5.  And success, even 
under the best circumstances, would not be guaranteed.  Yet, popular 
demand for aggressive anti-monopoly action seems to be growing. Given 
economic realities, the growing discontent in the country in general does 
not appear poised to subside any time soon.279  And the success of the 
FCC’s net neutrality rules show that there is a way forward for the FTC 
 276.  Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 189 (1965). 
 277.  For example, Senator John Sherman eschewed the arcane language of economics 
and declared: 
[If] we will not endure a king as a political power we should not endure a king 
over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life.  If 
we would not submit to an emperor we should not submit to an autocrat of 
trade, with power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity. 
21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890). 
 278.  Fung, supra note 267. 
 279.  Thomas Piketty, We Must Rethink Globalization, or Trumpism Will Prevail,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2016/nov/16/globalization-trump-inequality-thomas-piketty [https://perma.cc/6EYH-
CENA]. 
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even in the face of fierce corporate opposition.  The FTC’s defeats in the 
late 1970s do not compel another generation of agency quiescence. 
CONCLUSION
After decades of practical exile from popular discussion, monopoly 
and oligopoly are topics of public debate again.  Politicians and 
commentators from across the ideological spectrum acknowledge that there 
is a lack of competition across the U.S. economy and that the harms from 
this noncompetitive industrial structure are very real.  Importantly, many 
observers have recognized that the current industrial structure in the United 
States was the product of a deliberate policy choice.  Beginning in the late 
1970s and accelerating in the 1980s under the Reagan administration, 
antitrust officials in the executive branch and federal judges reinterpreted 
these laws to focus narrowly on the neoclassical economic concept of 
allocative efficiency and adopted legal standards favorable to powerful 
corporate defendants.  This stealth counterrevolution reinterpreted laws that 
Congress had enacted to check the myriad harms from concentrated 
corporate power. 
Although any judicial efforts to reinterpret the antitrust laws in accord 
with Congress’s original vision are uncertain and likely to take years, if not 
decades, the Federal Trade Commission under progressive leadership has 
the power to restore progressive-populist antitrust in the more immediate 
future.  Under contemporary administrative law and Congressional 
delegation of policymaking power, the Federal Trade Commission has 
broad authority to resurrect antitrust law under Section 5 of the FTC Act.  
In enacting this statute, Congress wanted the FTC to police “unfair 
methods of competition” that injure consumers and smaller sellers, prevent 
competitors from competing on the merits, and allow large corporations to 
dominate our political system.  Congress intended the FTC’s antitrust 
authority to encompass more than the prohibitions in the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts and to nip anticompetitive problems in the embryonic stage 
before they harmed markets and society. 
For more than thirty years, the FTC has been a proponent of an 
antitrust that stresses the primacy of economic efficiency.  The FTC’s 
Section 5 Statement indicated that the Commission would use its Section 5 
authority to advance “consumer welfare” and apply the rule of reason 
framework.  In articulating this narrow interpretation of Section 5, the FTC 
contradicted Congress’s broader political economic vision in 1914, which 
sought to prevent not only short-term injuries to consumers but also 
exclusionary practices by large businesses and the accumulation of private 
political power.  Furthermore, the FTC adopted the complicated rule of 
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reason that arguably cannot even protect consumers, let alone advance the 
progressive-populist philosophy underpinning Section 5. 
Despite being a champion of the efficiency paradigm since 1981, the 
FTC in the future could still change course and be true to Congressional 
intent in creating the agency in 1914.  In setting out an interpretation of 
Section 5, whether through enforcement actions or rulemakings, the FTC 
should anchor Section 5 in the expansive political economic vision of 
Congress.  In enacting the Federal Trade Commission Act to supplement 
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, Congress sought to prevent three principal 
harms from concentrated economic power: wealth transfers exacted by 
monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels, privately-erected barriers to 
competition, and accumulation of economic and political power in 
corporate hands.  To advance Congress’s antitrust vision and aim for the 
FTC Act to be a prophylactic statute, the FTC should adopt presumptions 
of illegality for a variety of competitively suspicious conduct, challenge 
durable or otherwise significantly harmful monopolies, and support simple 
structural remedies.  In adopting the proposed interpretation of Section 5, 
the FTC would be true to the vision Congress had in creating the 
Commission a century earlier and respond to growing popular and political 
demands to tackle the curse of pervasive monopoly and oligopoly in the 
economy. 
